Reforms for culmination of the deadlock in appellate body of WTO: An agenda of saving the multilateral trading system

Asif Khan; Ximei Wu

doi:10.47264/idea.jhsms/2.1.5

Authors

Asif Khan School of Law, Zhengzhou University, Henan, China. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5059-5976
Ximei Wu School of Law, Zhengzhou University, Henan, China.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.jhsms/2.1.5

Keywords:

World Trade Organization (WTO), Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), appellate body, deadlock, proposal, reforming, multilateral trading system

Abstract

The World Trade Organization's (WTO’s) dispute settlement mechanism, known as the "pearl in the crown," is stalled due to United States (U.S.) obstruction, which prevents appellate body members from being ordained. This situation continues, and the WTO’s dispute settlement function is paralyzed since 2019. The WTO has faced a crisis in recent years, and the trade legislation has stagnated. The dispute settlement body was also blocked due to U.S. interference, which led to the failure of the appellate body’s members to be selected. The data has been gathered for this descriptive study using secondary research method, including different newspaper articles and the internet, which were outlined and noted. This paper presents and evaluates several existing proposals on how to get out of the impasse. This paper points out whether the existing WTO members can choose to join or not participate in establishing a new appellate body. On this basis, it makes its own relatively unique proposal, namely, to establish a substantial dispute settlement mechanism outside the WTO, parallel to the existing dispute settlement mechanism, and it demonstrates the legal feasibility of the proposal. Immediately, the states should begin negotiations on the significant agreements required for this new appellate body. It will effectively solve the deadlock in the dispute settlement mechanism caused by the United States, blocking the appointment of members of the appellate body.

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