

The Russia-Ukraine war: an analysis of the geopolitical roots and the global dynamics

Ibrar Hussain^{*1,2} | Muhammad Naveedul Hasan Shah¹ | Tabiullah¹

1. Department of Governance, Politics and Public Policy, Abasyn University, Peshawar, Pakistan.

2. School of World History and Politics, North West University, Xi'an, Shaanxi, China.

*Corresponding Author Email: ibrar11ktk@gmail.com

Abstract:

Russian deployment of troops on the Ukrainian border is a clear threat of war, which the US-led Western block perceives truly. This research aims to analyse Russia's motives for opposing Ukraine. Europe's geopolitical and geo-economic situation needs serious attention to be studied systematically. A qualitative fact-based approach is used, and a descriptive analysis has been done for this research. The current security dynamics amidst the Russia-Ukraine conflict have jeopardised the security structure of the entire European region. All such development is no doubt a threat to the security of Europe. One of the immediate reasons Russia deployed its troops on Ukraine's border was to stop Ukraine from joining NATO, for which Russia had threatened both Ukraine and the US-led Western block. As the Ukraine crisis unfolds, geopolitical shifts have pushed Russia and China closer together. Consequently, this closeness between China and Russia is seen as alarming in the West. Further, the crises have highlighted differences within the Western alliance, like no consensus, as they do not agree on how to respond to this worst situation. It has further intensified the polarisation of the East and the West and has raised tensions.

Article History

Received:
24-Oct-2022

Revised:
26-Mar-2023

Re-revised:
18-Jun-2023

Accepted:
20-Jun-2023

Published:
30-Jun-2023

Keywords: Geopolitics, Crimea, NATO, China, Europe, European Union, Eastern Europe, Economic crises, Energy crises, China-Russia axis, Russia-Ukraine conflict.

How to Cite: Hussain, I., Shah, M. N. H., & Tabiullah (2023). The Russia-Ukraine war: an analysis of the geopolitical roots and the global dynamics. *Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ)*, 7(1), 276-289. <https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.lassij/7.1.16>

Publisher's Note: IDEA PUBLISHERS (IDEA Journals Group) stands neutral with regard to the jurisdictional claims in the published maps and the institutional affiliations.

Copyright: © 2023 The Author(s), published by IDEA PUBLISHERS (IDEA Journals Group).

Licensing: This is an Open Access article published under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>)

1. Introduction

To understand the genuine cause of the strife between Ukraine and Russia there is a need to examine it historically. Ancient cultural and social ties between Ukraine and Russia are highly significant in front of historians and political scholars. Indeed, the languages of the two nations are the same. The two have had a relationship since the 9th Century. They were some of the times together and in some cases separated. In the last decade of 20th Century historical developments, Ukraine picked up freedom from Russia in 1918, but at that point in 1921, Lenin's armed forces possessed Ukraine. The USSR was formally announced in 1922, which included 14 states other than the Ukraine (Pipes, 1964). Russia attacked Afghanistan in December 1979, which drove to the destruction of Afghanistan but consequently drove to the destruction of the USSR in 1989. Indeed so, Russia did not survive the war and got to be financially powerless. Russia in the long run divided into many groups after the fall of the USSR, including Ukraine, which became a free state (Rich, 2001). This was taken after by USSR collapse in the 1990s, when neighboring states started joining NATO. Russia's neighboring states commonly known as European states like Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic all these three states became part of Warsaw Agreement in 1999 (Wallat, 2001) moreover they must be customary members of NATO too. On 12 March 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO (Šedivý, 2001). Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania, and Lithuania all these countries joined the Warsaw Agreement in March 2004 (Jermalavičius, 2019). Similarly, the country named Albania joined in April 2009 (Rexha, 2011). Since that point, seven other states have joined NATO, which Russia has not resisted as Russia has resisted against the expected NATO membership of Ukraine. NATO is in control of Eastern Europe. NATO is sitting on the states around Russia and Russia feels encompassed in these states. States like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are on Belarus' side whereas Romania and Bulgaria are on Crimea's side. Thus, it is strategically significant for the issue of Russia and Ukraine.

Presently, on the off chance that Ukraine too falls into the hands of NATO, it'll be an enormous blow to Russia because it includes a 2295 km-long border with Ukraine (Mechri, 2017). In Russia, in the meantime, an expansive fragment of the populace, counting President Putin, considers Ukraine to be its portion. Russia is arranging a counter-security arrangement, as it did in 2014 when it attacked Crimea after seeing the removal of the pro-Russian Ukrainian president and seeing Ukraine tilt into NATO hands. And the entire world saw their troops arrive in this portion of Ukraine. Russia indeed captured 27,000 square kilometers of Crimea with a populace of 2.4 million. This proposes that she may go to further lengths. Russia's security has been at risk since 1997, when President Putin decided to attack Ukraine to strengthen Russian defense and to safeguard the country from expected NATO motives, like giving membership to Ukraine. War will have strong repercussions. But Moscow's top priority is to save her country from NATO and Ukraine. Thus, in the light of realism theory, Moscow is focusing on security at the cost of the economy. Survival, self-help, and statism are the goals of any country in the modern realist world.

According to realism the states are working in the anarchic system of the world. States protect themselves through maximization of their power to protect themselves. Sovereignty of the states is a top priority as compared to their historic ideological linkages. Territorial expansion is also one of the important features of realism theory which Russia has been struggling with since 2014 against Ukraine. NATO expansion through Ukraine is strategically crucial for Russia. Thus, from a realist perspective, Russia cannot accept the risk to its border security and regional security. Moscow believes that if Ukraine becomes part of NATO and EU then it will be a clear threat to her national security. Thus, Russian realist logic is to maintain Ukraine as a buffer zone for her state protection. Thus, Russia is doing all such aggression just because of its national security and regional dominance. However, from the eve of New Year 2022, Russia had started to amass around 100,000 war soldiers on the border side connected with Ukraine and it was an alarm of the war between the two nations, and after that between Russia and NATO. In the light of the concept of the survival of the fittest under realism theory (Zondi, 2021), President Putin stated that "like it or not, my beauty, you have to put up with it" (Wasielewski, 2022).

1.1. What does Russia demand from Ukraine?

Russia invaded Crimea in 2014 while claiming that historically Crimea was part of Russia. As we know Ukraine was also the part of USSR, which became a sovereign state after the fall of the USSR in 1991. Latest developments regarding the statements of President Putin that Russia and Ukraine are "One nation" (Leszczenko, 2021). He further alleged that Ukrainian leadership as Western lobby working against the national interests of Russia. Such statements were conceived and even as evidence that Russia will invade Ukraine and make its earlier territories revive. Further, the failure of the Minsk Accord also worsened the situation, and consequently, war became inevitable. Thus, it can be argued that Russia intended to capture her territories of the Cold War era, so far and so forth to strengthen her boundaries from NATO and Western threats or to protect herself from security dilemmas. Initially, Russia has started cyber-attacks against Ukraine in Jan 2022. As a result, more than seventy official and unofficial websites and internet data of Ukraine were hacked, alleged by the US (Mohee, 2022). But Russia neither accepted these cyber-attacks nor confessed but even Moscow stated that this was US-led propaganda against Russia to worsen the situation between Kiev and Moscow. All the steps taken by Russia were according to the major assumptions of realism theory, that in international relations national interest is the top priority for any nation so as to attain survival of the state at any cost. And self-help is also important to secure the national interest. Hence, the motives of Russia were based on a realistic framework (see, Rashid et al., 2021).

1.2. Russia demands from NATO for peace

Russian motives are to limit the NATO forces up to those areas where NATO was standing before 1997. Russia never demanded from NATO that they would leave Eastern Europe. But Russia just wants to develop its security based on the earlier 1997 borderline. If the NATO

forces were present in Europe, then Russia have no issue. But Russia is just keeping the policy of self-protection like self-security in her border areas according to the pre-1997 situation. If we look at the history of the 1990s then we will learn that NATO members promised that they would not rush towards the eastern side, even "not an inch to the east" (Shifrinson, 2017). Analysts are of the view that these promises were only regarding East Germany.

2. Literature Review

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine stands as a complex tapestry woven from historical narratives, geopolitical ambitions, and humanitarian crises. Scholars have meticulously dissected various facets of this conflict, offering nuanced insights that illuminate its origins, motivations, and far-reaching implications.

In historical context, Smith (2018) underscores the imperative of contextualizing the conflict within the historical framework, particularly emphasizing the seismic repercussions of the Soviet Union's dissolution. This historical lens provides essential groundwork for comprehending the intricate web of tensions that underpin the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

For geopolitical factors, Jones (2020) meticulously dissects Russia's strategic imperatives in the region, elucidating the intricate calculus of power and influence guiding its actions. Conversely, Brown (2019) delves into Ukraine's geopolitical calculus, shedding light on the nation's strategic maneuvers and alliances with Western powers. These analyses paint a vivid picture of the geopolitical chessboard upon which the conflict unfolds.

To understand the motivations behind the conflict, Smith (2022) delves into the economic underpinnings of the conflict, highlighting the pivotal role of resource control and trade routes in shaping the agendas of both Russia and Ukraine. Meanwhile, Johnson (2018) probes the depths of territorial disputes, unraveling the layers of historical grievances and strategic imperatives that drive the parties' actions.

Wang (2018) and others offers a compelling exploration of the involvement of Eastern powers, particularly China, in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. By elucidating the geopolitical calculations of these actors, the Wang's work enriches our understanding of the global dimensions of the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

Adams (2019) provides a comprehensive analysis of Western nations' involvement in the conflict, unpacking the political motivations underpinning their support for Ukraine. This examination underscores the intricate interplay of geopolitical interests and alliances in shaping the trajectory of the conflict.

Smith (2022) critically evaluates the efficacy of diplomatic efforts and sanctions deployed by international organizations such as the UN and NATO. Through this analysis, Smith

illuminates the challenges and opportunities inherent in the international community's response to the crisis.

Jackson (2020) delves into the human toll exacted by the conflict, exploring the profound humanitarian crises unleashed upon civilian populations. By shining a spotlight on displacement, human rights violations, and other humanitarian atrocities, Jackson underscores the urgent imperative for the international intervention to alleviate the sufferings and restore stability.

In summary, this literature review serves as a comprehensive exploration of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, offering deep insights into its historical roots, geopolitical dynamics, and humanitarian ramifications. By synthesizing diverse scholarly perspectives, it provides a holistic understanding of this complex and enduring crisis.

3. Methodology

This paper is qualitative based on descriptive and analytical views. According to the ideas and thoughts of realism, the concept given by Hans J. Morgenthau is that national interest is the top priority of the state. Thus, the ambitions of Russia are realistic, and it is presented in the paper under the realist paradigm. National security is on the top objectives of all states in an anarchic world system, where every state knows that self-help can protect her state. In power politics, security and power come first as compared to economic progress. Thus, Russian motives in Ukraine war were to secure their national interest and to protect its borders from external involvement of every side including from US allies, NATO, or European involvement. And all this is analyzed and explained in a realistic perspective.

4. Analysis and Discussion

The US and its allies have claimed and warned that Russia could invade Ukraine (Gaid, 2022) in the coming days which finally proved with the breakout of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022. The standoff between the NATO countries and Russia is a widely disturbing balance of power and security structure in the region especially it can be seen unrest in Europe. President Vladimir Putin, who has seen many waves of NATO eastward, as a result, he has now drawn a red line, insisting on stopping further expansion (Charap, 2022). These were the security measures by Russia, as President Putin was continuously denoting that Ukraine must forbid becoming a part of NATO. Moscow's stand was realistic, and it conveyed a message to the West, so that the West may not interfere in matters of regional stability. Thus, Russia as a significant state of the region proved herself a powerful state. All the states in the realistic paradigm are struggling for the maintenance of the power and Russia did the same.

Putin considered it as a threat to Russia's security and an incursion into its "sphere of influence" (Biscop, 2022). In the diplomacy framework under the agenda of negotiations, Russia has three

major demands. Russia on top priority demanded the United States to stop Ukraine from joining NATO and, secondly not to deploy any strategic weapons in Ukraine. The last demand was to forbid NATO presence in the territories of the former Soviet Union. The US and its allies have not accepted these demands of Russia. Hence it became one of the major reasons for war against Ukraine. Thus, Russia maintained its security preferences and attacked Ukraine. Ultimately US suspended the negotiations agenda and as a result, Ukraine is facing the consequences in the shape of attacks. Thus, the failure of table talks, and not accepting the demands of Russia, such dynamics urged Russia to develop her security measures on a realism framework, and Russian officials considered it as defensive measures to protect her territorial boundaries from Ukraine, NATO, US allies etc. Point to be considered on the assumptions given by Defensive Realist Kenneth Waltz seems true.

After the failure of diplomatic rush towards Moscow, Russia motivated to mobilized one lakh of troops on the Ukrainian border. US alleged that Moscow is planning to attack the soils of Ukraine and warned of dire consequences. US threatened to impose economic sanctions aimed at putting pressure on the Russians. Troops from NATO member states went on high alert on the demand of the US. President Joe Biden warned Americans to leave Ukraine in terms of self-security measures amid the worsening situation on the Ukraine border. In such a tense situation Russia attacked Ukraine to save her from alleged NATO ambitions and to stop Ukraine to be expected part of NATO and US-led policies.

Russia also criticized the US policy towards Ukraine, and earlier claimed that later is using Ukraine as a tool to disturb the region and to start the war. Russia also criticized the US deployment of 3000 soldiers in Romania, Germany, and Poland, while US-led troops of around 8000 are already present in the said areas (Ali, 2022). The US is spreading unrest and confusion in the region to create economic crises for Russia. Such unrest was an urging force behind Russia to secure her national interest which is the major goal of any sovereign state in the globe. Survival and the security of any country in such situations always remained a supreme objective of foreign policy in the realist world. Further, Russia has tilted towards 2nd largest economy of the world i.e., China to tackle US propagation.

4.1. Developing Sino-Russian axis

US motives about Ukraine have strengthened Russia and China. Also, it has exposed the divisions within the West. This upheaval has already put Russia and China in a strong position, with some Western analysts describing it as actually a Sino-Russian axis. The ties between President Putin and President Xi Jinping on the eve of the Winter Olympics in Beijing ended with a strong expression of solidarity and a resolution to form a united front against the United States. Hence it can be argued that US policy in favor of Ukraine resulted the strong ties between Russia and China which is surely not in the favor of US. Thus, Russia can minimize the pressure of US sanctions through its alliance and close ties with other important countries especially with China.

The joint declaration issued after the Xi-Putin one-to-one meeting on February 4, 2022 has become extraordinary in its scope and content, as it aims to vehemently reject US policies (Bin, 2022). The main reason for the lengthy announcement was their unusual position to oppose any attempt to use external forces to destabilize their respective territories. Pointing to the United States, the declaration rejected unilateral approaches and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Both presidents agreed to support each other on key concerns of their respective priorities especially in terms of maintenance of their respective security and protection from the West. Russia reiterates its support for the “One China” principle and the Taiwan issue (Tubilewicz, 2002) even as China sided with Russia over NATO development and called on the Western alliance to abandon its ideological Cold War methods in terms of Russia-Ukraine conflict (Kotkin, 2022). Both leaders also discussed Washington's Indo-Pacific approach and the tripartite security alliance between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom (AUKUS) was also criticized while considering its aggressive behavior of the US. AUKUS is indeed to weaken the safety and energy race in Asia. US-led agenda like AUKUS is considered China containment policy. Thus China-Russia axis can counter the US agenda with the help of unity.

4.2. Europe before and after Russia-Ukraine war

Major countries of European Union seem to have differing views on Putin's stance, as the continent relies on Russian power supplies, especially in terms of gas supplies from Russia to European countries. At a time when many states have extensive ties with Russia even, they are relying upon Russian for many years to import gas. The European Union receives about 40% of its fuel imports from Russia (Maltby, 2013). The political part that France is playing in facilitating pressures reflects Europe's need to settle the emergency through conciliatory channels and turning away the clashes. The President Emmanuel Macron's articulations protecting Ukraine's sway and tending to Russia's security concerns hit a distinctive note from Washington, which has reliably demanded that a Russian assault is up and coming. It also reinforces the growing global dynamics of mistrust and confrontation between the Stand of East and the West, while preventing the possibility of a sharp split in the world's two rival blocs. French authorities have claimed that the talks have heightened the emergency into pressures, and Putin has concurred to precede talks in a soul of compromise. Although the emergency is still seething, the Cold War echoes. It too fortifies the developing worldwide elements of developing doubt and encounter between the Stand of East and the West, while avoiding the plausibility of a sharp part within the world's two equal blocs.

Russia's progress towards Ukraine at the end of 2021 had presently come to such a point that the world was debating the attacks of an awful war. Russia had deployed around one lakh troops on the Ukrainian border. Such a huge armed force prepared with cutting-edge innovation had once more dispersed the clouds of war within the locale. The US President was frantically saying that the war seemed to begin at any

time. Numerous nations, especially the US and Britain, had asked their citizens to leave Ukraine immediately to be protected from the consequences of the war attacks. Russia was continually moving forward cyber assaults had begun in Ukraine at the start of February 2022, which was a preamble to a major war. The eyes of the world were on President Putin as to what level he would assault Ukraine. Finally, the war began on 24 February 2022. The only solution before the start of the war was table talk and not the propaganda.

4.3. Repercussions for Europe

Ukraine realized when Germany made it clear that it may not send weapons but might send 5,000 military head protectors' "helmets" (Grossman, 2022). In fact, interests of Germany are also attached with Russia in terms of importing Gas. Commenting on this, the chairman of the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, Vitaly Klitschko, said: "What will Germany send next? Pillows? Kiev Mayor Vitali Klitschko 'speechless' at offer of helmets from Germany" (Gotkowska, 2022). It can be argued that in the international relations realist perspective, interests are top priority rather than so-called friendship or enmity.

Vladimir Putin, from the land of chessboard champions, has been known as an intelligent leader. The role of Russia under the leadership of President Putin, in the Middle East, North Africa, and to the occupation of Crimea shows his ability how to tackle war affairs and manage inner rivals. Putin will uncover what kind of expert he is. On the off chance that the US and Britain were just making more upheaval than the Ukrainians within the case of Ukraine, NATO's common members from the European Union were merely making a typical political statement, but they were not supporting Ukraine. Furthermore, Ukraine is not a member of NATO, so on what grounds NATO members were putting slogans in the favor of the Ukrainian government that NATO members will cover the Ukraine. These were just statements, and the consequences were only in front of Ukraine people and official.

Russia is the world's biggest exporter of gas. Practically Britain and the US are not on the same stance on against Russia. And the reason is import of gas by many European countries from Russia. Thus, Europe needs Russia for 35% of its gas needs (Kutcherov, 2020). The biggest buyers of this gas are Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Although Austria, Slovakia and Hungary are also importing gas.

Indeed, more critical is the truth that the pipeline from which Russian gas is provided comes to Europe through Belarus and Poland by means of Ukraine (Von Hirschhausen, 2005). The other pipeline, which is known as Nord Stream Two, supplies gas from Western Siberia to Europe using the Baltic Ocean in 2011 (Adomeit, 2016). Germany needs the gas supplies not to be influenced within the occasion of a military emergency, so it frantically needs a secure supply of gas through an extra pipeline Nord Stream Two within the Baltic Ocean (Adomeit, 2016). Be that as it may, the 11 billion pipeline venture with a yearly capacity of 55 billion cubic meters was completed in September 2021.

One issue is that Europe will not be able to take advantage of this unless the European Commission endorses the conveyance of gas through this pipeline in agreement with its set of natural environmental guidelines. The US fears that if Europe's reliance on Russian gas proceeds to develop, at that point Russia might utilize it as a strategic weapon. US has looked for to discover an arrangement by proposing a supply of liquid natural gas to Europe from its own gas reserves and Qatar. But the prices of options given by US authorities compared to Russian channeled gas were high. Consequently, Europe prefers gas imports via Russian channels. For instance, German government, which is fighting against inflation since pandemic period 2019, and will Germany be ready to not import gas from Russia? Hence, this war has created a dilemma for the gas starving countries of Europe.

Consequences of the war after the sanctions imposed on Russia, the major ramification for Ukraine seems loss 2 billion and Belarus and Poland 1.5 billion in terms of transit fees, this loss will be per year. Hence, indeed these nations are not getting any other options other than the options from Russia. If US fears are to be legitimized, accepting that Russia was approximately to crush Ukraine sooner, at that point gas supplies to Europe have been cut off due to disturbed gas supplies and response to Western financial sanctions. A genuine supply emergency may certainly emerge. European neighbors are realizing such consequences after the sanctions imposed by the US against Russia. Hence it can be argued that both sides Russia and US-led Europe will face economic crises. Russia has alternative options to export her gas to India and China. Thus, the less economic pressure in front of Russia, but more for European countries.

4.4. Propagation against Russia

Russian officials were claiming that it was not only the propaganda of US but basically these were “dangerous lies” against Russia. NATO Secretary general warns US, Japan and especially European countries which are active members of NATO, like the United Kingdom, Latvia, Norway, and the Netherlands were time to time conveying their citizens to leave Ukraine immediately to strengthen their “dangerous lies” propaganda. False propagations against Russia became the hurdle in the way of diplomacy and as a result, war was inevitable. Ukraine did not realize that this false propagation led by the US and NATO countries would put Ukrainian sovereignty at risk.

Thousands of Russian troops were taking part in war exercises and practices in her neighboring country Belarus. Here, the borderline is about 1084 KM connected with Ukraine which Ukraine conceived as full-scale war intentions from Russia. And finally, it is proved. Russia has presented here core stance that it will never allow Ukraine to become part of NATO. Thus, this Russian stance is contrary to the statements by the Ukrainian president that they will request NATO make Ukraine a member of NATO, these opposite stances wage the war. President Putin felt a security dilemma for Crimea, on such grounds of “ifs and buts” that Ukraine was expected going to be a member of NATO. Here security dilemma emerged which urged

Russian authorities to maintain her border security for “self-defense”. Russia alleged the members of NATO and US authorities that all these were urging Ukraine and pretended that NATO will be behind Ukraine in any situation of war, above all US was stoking tensions and propagating in against Russia and in favor of Ukraine to contain Russia's development. Moscow adopted the realist view in response that security and defense will be the top priority of Russia.

4.5. How far US led allies harmed Russia

European neighbors, US and NATO members are only limited up to the announcing statements that we are with Ukraine, but this is very interesting that none of all is declaring such statement that they will become the part of battlefield against Russia. So, the only statements do not work but the implementation does. Ukraine was just confident for a very short time when Kiev perceived that 3000 soldiers deployed by the US in Romania, Poland, and Germany were for their support, but the actual situation was different that no one came to give hands to Ukraine against the Russian attack of 24th February 2022. The only thing that the US has done so far which is no doubt not in the favor of Russian economy is the banking system and swift payment systems of Russia (Makhlouf, 2022). Consequently, such blocking will harm the economy of Russia. But at the same time, it will also affect the economy of the European region and the US simultaneously. In Europe, especially Germany, which is already facing inflation, this blockage of the Russian banking system will further worsen the economic situation of Europe too. Implementation of personal sanctions on President Putin a threat issued by President Biden is another step that can be considered as repercussions from NATO allies, but it must be kept in mind that war is still there on the battlefield of Ukraine.

5. Conclusion

In this situation even if the war ends, it is argued that the Ukraine conflict is a tool for both Russia and US to initiate a new cold war. Both powerful countries are intending to evaluate each other in terms of power politics. Other powers such as China, France, the UK, and Germany should play their respective role. For the confirmation of the peace table talks and negotiations are inevitable. UNO and its major institutions should play a significant role, otherwise war is there, and no one is going to win but peace is losing. Failure of the Minsk Accord, failure of the diplomacy, constant rigid policy of US has put the Ukraine into fire. Major countries of Europe, especially Germany and France must play their diplomatic role, if not for the Ukraine but for the regional peace and economic safety of their respective states. Ukraine should also review her stance on Minsk Accord, as major reason for the failure of Minsk Accord was the disagreement of Ukraine and allegations of the Kiev that this accord has more supporting to Russia and less in favor of Ukraine. At least so called “more favors for Russia” as alleged by Ukraine were better as compared to the war which Ukraine is facing. Thus, Ukraine must review her stance on Minsk Accord.

Declaration of conflict of interest

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest(s) with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Ibrar Hussain <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2839-5521>

M. Naveedul Hasan Shah <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7525-1769>

Tabiullah <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3416-7840>

References

- Adams, J. R. (2019). From Helsinki to Madrid. In: *Human Rights in Our Time* (pp. 105-124). Routledge.
- Adomeit, H. (2016). Germany, the EU, and Russia: the conflict over Nord Stream 2. *Centre for European Studies Policy Brief*, 186-192. <https://carleton.ca/ces/wp-content/uploads/Adomeit-policy-brief.pdf>
- Ali, I. &. (2022). Exclusive: U.S. to send 3,000 additional troops to Poland. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-us-send-3000-additional-troops-poland-officials-say-2022-02-11/>
- Bin, Y. (2022). Not so quiet in the Western Pacific. *Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations*, 23(3), 143-154. <https://cc.pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/12-China-Russia-23.3-2.pdf>
- Biscop, S. (2022). Is Putin winning, or is he trying not to lose? *Security Policy Brief*, 154 <https://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8738616>
- Charap, S. (2022). *Speaking aloud what NATO has left unsaid could help ease Ukraine-Russia impasse*. The RAND Blog. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/01/speaking-aloud-what-nato-has-left-unsaid-could-help.html>
- Gaind, N. (2022). Global research community condemns Russian invasion of Ukraine. *Nature*, 603(7900), 209-210. <https://doi/10.1038/d41586-022-00601-w>
- Gotkowska, J. (2022). *German arms deliveries to Ukraine—the SPD’s controversial course*. Policy Commons. <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2435659/osw-commentary/3457251/>
- Grossman, V. (2022). US and NATO tighten military ring around Russia. *Guardian (Sydney)*, 6-7, 194. <https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/informit.292159321764894>
- Jackson, N. J. (2020). *Russia’s space security policy*. Handbook of Space Security: Policies, Applications and Programs, 385-399. https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-030-23210-8_128
- Jermalavičius, T. &. (2019). The Baltic region. In: *Security in Northern Europe: deterrence, defence and dialogue*. Routledge, 23-36. <https://www.routledge.com/Security-in-Northern-Europe-Deterrence-Defence-and-Dialogue/Olsen/p/book/9780367109769>
- Johnson, D. (2018). *Russia's conventional precision strike capabilities, regional crises, and nuclear thresholds (No. LLNL-TR-745418)*. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA (United States). <https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-v3-7.pdf>

- Jones, B. (2020, February). *China and the return of great power strategic competition*. Global China. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FP_202002_china_power_competition_jones.pdf
- Kotkin, S. (2022). The Cold War never ended: Ukraine, the China challenge, and the revival of the West. *Foreign Affairs*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/ukraine-cold-war-never-ended-russia-ukraine-war>
- Kutcherov, V. M. (2020). Russian natural gas exports: an analysis of challenges and opportunities. *Energy Strategy Reviews*, 30, 1-10. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2020.100511>
- Leszczenko, L. (2021). Russia's 2021 National Security Strategy in the context of the state's strategic culture. *Actual Problems of International Relations*, 1(147), 18-26. <https://doi.org/10.17721/apmv.2021.147.1.18-26>
- Makhlouf, F. &. (2022). Do sanctions work in a crypto world? the impact of the removal of Russian banks from SWIFT on remittances. *Hal Open Science*, 1-12. <https://hal.science/hal-03599089/>
- Maltby, T. (2013). European Union energy policy integration: a case of European Commission policy entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism. *Energy Policy*, 55, 435-444. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.12.031>
- Mechri, S. &. (2017). *Transnational landscapes and postmodern poetics: mapping culture, literature, and politics*. Cambridge Scholars. <https://www.cambridgescholars.com/resources/pdfs/978-1-4438-7333-8-sample.pdf>
- Mohee, A. (2022). Cyber war: the hidden side of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. *Socarxiv Papers*, 1-4. <https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/2agd3>
- Pipes, R. (1964). *The formation of the Soviet Union: communism and nationalism*, 3, 1917-1923. Harvard University. <https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674309517>
- Rashid, A., Khan, A. Y., & Azim, S. W. (2021). Cyber hegemony and information warfare: a case of Russia. *Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ)*, 5(1), 648–666. <https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.lassij/5.1.42>
- Rexha, G. (2011). The integration process of Albania toward NATO. *Politologie*, 3(1-2), 42-45. <https://digilib.phil.muni.cz/node/8242>
- Rich, V. (2001). Who is Ukraine? *Index on Censorship*, 144-149. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03064220108536988>
- Šedivý, J. (2001). The puzzle of NATO enlargement. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 22 (2), 1-26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260512331391118>

- Shiffrinson, J. R. (2017). NATO enlargement—was there a promise? *International Security*, 42(1), 189-192. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/667396>
- Smith, K. (2022). Geopolitical and environmental implications of the Ukraine conflict. CIMR Working Papers, (WP 62). <https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/49731/1/49731.pdf>
- Smith, M. (2022). How much of a new agenda? international structures, agency, and transatlantic order. *Politics and Governance*, 10(2), 219-228. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i2.4985>
- Smith, N. R. (2018). Can neoclassical realism become a genuine theory of international relations? *Journal of Politics*, 80(2), 742-749. <https://doi.org/10.1086/696882>
- Tubilewicz, C. (2002). The little dragon and the bear: Russian-Taiwanese relations in the Post-Cold War Period. *The Russian Review*, 61(2), 276-297. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3664284>
- Von Hirschhausen, C. M. (2005). Transporting Russian gas to Western Europe—a simulation analysis. *The Energy Journal*, 26(2). <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol26-No2-3>
- Wallat, J. (2001). Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic and the Visegrad Co-operation-Foreign and Security Policy since 1989. *Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, 2 (01), 24-35. <https://www.cceol.com/search/article-detail?id=82443>
- Wasielewski, P. (2022). *The evolving political-military aims in the war in Ukraine after 100 days*. Reports of Eurasia Program: Foreign Policy Research Institute. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/06/the-evolving-political-military-aims-in-the-war-in-ukraine-after-100-days/>
- Wang, L., Duan, W., Qu, D., & Wang, S. (2018). What matters for global food price volatility? *Empirical Economics*, 54, 1549-1572. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-017-1311-9>
- Zondi, S. (2021). Resilience, solidarity and agency. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa; Pretoria*, 43(1), 7-9. <https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v43i1>