

Reinventing the Identity and Interests: Pakistan and the Middle East (1971 to 1979)

Farrukh Faheem¹⁻², Abida Bano³ & Wang Xingang*¹⁻⁴

1. Department of World History, Northwest University, Xian, Shaanxi, China.
2. Department of History, Higher Education Department, Punjab, Pakistan.
3. Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, University of Peshawar, Pakistan.
4. Syrian Research Centre, Northwest University, Xian, Shaanxi, China.

Received: August 23, 2020

Published Online: December 27, 2020

Abstract

Pakistan's territorial mutilation in the 1971 war with India was the utmost military, psychological and political disaster for Pakistan. Pakistan lost its Eastern wing and more than ninety thousand soldiers, civilians, and along with the territory, all the same to India. In the prevailing uncertainty, Pakistan vigorously asserted its Islamic Identity to foster its moral, economic, and political interests to revive from the loss. It looked towards the Middle East to revive its national identity and interests' fulfilment. During the Seventies, political changes within the Middle Eastern region were also favourable and useful for promoting Islamic ideology and shared identity. There was much scope to achieve ideological, strategic, economic, and foreign policy objectives that Pakistan missed in the past. The new Pakistani civilian government under Bhutto arranged shuttle diplomacy overtures the Middle Eastern Muslim countries to convince them to help Pakistan rebuild its identity and achieve its interests. Bhutto was one of the principal architects of the newly charged Muslim unity. He skilfully and effectively used the OIC platform to guard the country's identity and interests.

Keywords: Identity, National Identity, National Interests, Indo-Pak War, 1971 War, Arab-Israel War, Middle East, OIC, Bhutto Rule.

1. Introduction

For Pakistan and even for the entire Muslim world, good relationships with big powers always remained a priority. Therefore, Pakistan has continuously tried to make a strong alliance with the West, while it took for granted the Muslim world, and the same was the case from the other side. However, after 1970, the unfolding events (Arab-Israel war, Oil crisis) in the Middle East, and Pakistan's disintegration with independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh, the Muslim world started sincere efforts to ally with the Muslim states for the common good. The then Pakistan's Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was instrumental in shaping and facilitating this relationship during the 1970s; he seized the moment to reinvent Pakistan's identity formation. Z. A. Bhutto brought the major Muslim world's leaders together to chalk out the Muslim world's idea of unity. The Petro-dollar money further enhanced the Muslim countries' confidence to materialize this dream of a unified identity – the Muslim world. Both Pakistan and the Middle Eastern Muslim countries marked the moment to balance their respective economic and strategic interests.

The sparse scholarly literature on the topic and almost no literature focusing on Pakistan's foreign policy, emphasizing identity and interest collaboration with the Middle Eastern Muslim states motivates this study. In a somewhat similar manner, Jalal (2014) looks at how the Muslim identity has been shaped through a mix of religion, nationalism, and culture in the period from 1850 to 1947 in the Indian Sub-continent. However, there is no particular focus on Pakistan forging its identity with the Muslim world in the 1970s as a consciously made strategic choice by the Bhutto regime. Raj (2010), Jalal (2014), and other scholars have covered Pakistan's identity aspect to an extent, but they have not looked at the identity connected with Pakistan's foreign policy in the Seventies.

A recent biographical cum journalistic commentary written by the BBC's correspondent in Pakistan, Owen Bennett-Jones provides its readers a detailed history of the Bhutto dynasty. His books, *The Bhutto Dynasty* and *The Struggle for Power in Pakistan*, gave some glimpses about Bhutto's yearning for a strong relationship with the Middle Eastern states to protect Pakistan's identity interests (Bennett-Jones, 2020). Nevertheless, this work also lacks to provide the required details about Pakistan's foreign policy. The paucity of literature on combining Pakistan's foreign policy focusing on relations between Middle Eastern Muslim states and Pakistan with a further emphasis on identity is focus of this study. This paper investigates and analyses the connections between identity formation and Pakistan's foreign policy in the aftermath of the Pak-India war in 1971. It further assesses that if the Bhutto regime could achieve the curiously carved out shared Muslim identity with the Muslim Middle East in securing Pakistan's interests between 1971 to 1979.

2. Theoretical Perspectives

This research explores the identity and interest-driven collaboration between the Middle Eastern Muslim States and Pakistan in 1971-1979. An attempt has been made to understand the construction of Pakistan's national identity that supports a foreign policy of cooperation with Middle Eastern Muslim States. The search for an appropriate theoretical framework for this research begins by focusing on constructivism general tenets and later, specifically, on Alexander Wendt's constructivist theoretical framework (Wendt, 1999). Drawing on the constructivism approaches, Wendt (1999) builds a cultural theory of international politics, wherein he emphasizes that the states view each other in multiple ways such as rivals, enemies, and friends. These characterizations are Lockean, Hobbesian, and Kantian, respectively. Referring to the Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures of relationships between states, he argues that these cultures help shape the states' interests and capabilities. This paper uses Wendt's constructionist theorizing of various cultures of relations between the states and argues that since Pakistan and Muslim Middle East had more in common, Islam is the most significant commonality. Thus, they made real efforts to build a strong concept of identity and interests to benefit from it mutually.

3. Research Methodology

The paper uses qualitative research approaches for data collection and analysis. It employs discourse analysis (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) for analyzing the discourses regarding the identity and interests of Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1971 war and cessation of Eastern Pakistan. Discourse analysis is one of the widely used social constructionist approaches in the social sciences. Additionally, it considers several analytic concepts and strategies to complete the investigation. According to Wood and Krooger (2000), varieties of discourse analysis

differentiate on account of epistemological positions (constructionist vs. critical realist) and the role of theory, among others. Combining Marxism and structuralism, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) develops a poststructuralist theory on discourse, which appreciates the social world as a web of processes that creates meanings. More specifically, the discourse analysis of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) is interested in evaluating how the structure is constituted and changed in the shape of discourses. The present study aims to analyze the discursive struggle of identity and subsequent changes in Pakistan's foreign policy in the post-1971 war between Pakistan and India. Lastly, the study's data sources include scholarly published books, articles, newspaper items, and publicly available official documents.

4. Pakistan's Quest for Identity in Post-1971 Indo-Pak War and Foreign Policy's Proclivities

The cessation of the East wing of Pakistan on December 16, 1971, brought new realities and more challenges for Pakistan. India became powerful, while Pakistan was no more a prominent player in South East Asian affairs. The 1971 War had been an unprecedented disaster for Pakistan. In the words of British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper: In December 1971, Pakistan was divided, defeated, demoralized, and disgraced in the eyes of the world. Post-1971 events provided Pakistan a chance to correct the course of its Foreign policy. Pakistan once again opted to use Islam to reinvent its identity that shattered after the fall of Dhaka. "The imprints of Islam on Pakistan's foreign policy turned more conspicuous when a major national humiliation in 1971 and severe identity crisis forced Pakistan to seek a formidable way to overcome these setbacks, and it was by falling back on Islam" (Shahid, 2010). The disintegration also allowed Pakistan to fully concentrate on its internal affairs with the Middle East powers. As for the changes in Pakistan, the country which emerged in the aftermath of the December 1971 war had found itself placed in a vital position, vis-à-vis the Middle East (Mustafa, 1975; Shaikh, 2009). Pakistan needed a complete revamping of its foreign policy to explore new avenues to fulfil its internal and external needs.

In many ways, 1970 was a decade that shattered the whole Muslim world. The subsequent wars of Arabs with Israel and Pakistan with India in 1965 made them realize their weakness. These events gradually lead them to a closer relationship among the Muslim World under a Pan-Islamic forum. After the 1971 tragedy, Pakistan annulled its membership of SEATO since East Pakistan became Bangladesh. Also, Pakistani leadership was sincerely thinking of overthrowing the western yoke of Defence pacts, which did nothing to protect her from external aggression. Thus, Pakistan withdrew its commonwealth membership but remained a CENTO member to retain friendly ties with Iran and Turkey (Pande, 2011; Lieven, 2011). Also, in 1973 the Ramadan war between Arabs and Israel brought devastation for the Arab world. At least two critical forces had a profound impact on Pakistan's relations with the Middle East. First, the Middle East's emergence as a powerful force in international politics, and second, the fundamental changes in Pakistan's geopolitical features changed the scenario (Mustafa, 1975). Hence, the defeat of Muslim countries in the war made way for a new alliance in the region, which also proved favourable for Pakistan.

Furthermore, the disaster of East Pakistan further worsened the fabric of Pakistani's polity. Islam's newfound importance as an identity would become central to all power struggles in the 1970s later. The salience of Islamic arguments in politics became immediately evident in Pakistan's 1973 Constitution (Afzal, 1968). Additionally, the growing ethnic cleavages in a society convinced the political leadership to re-evaluate Pakistan's identity boundaries. Once

again, they took refuge in Islam – a time trusted strategy. The cessation of East Pakistan confirmed the vulnerabilities of Pakistan along the ethnic lines. To avoid another fatality, Pakistan resorted to the ideological underpinnings of the country, which were rooted in the Islamic Identity (Nasr, 2001)

Pakistan's deliberate attempt to ally with the Muslim world was a multi-purpose endeavour that could help Pakistan internally and externally, coping with its identity and economic issues at the same time. Rizvi (1993) argues that Pakistan projects its Islamic identity in foreign policy partly because of Islam's close association with the establishment of the state and partly because it has yielded concrete gains in the diplomatic, economic, and security fields. Strategic use of Islam in Pakistan's foreign policy paid back well in terms of legitimacy and economic support from Muslim brethren states. Thus, the Islamic component of its foreign policy has been pragmatic and instrumental in gaining support for Islamic causes for Pakistan and has served Pakistan's material national interests (Svante, 2006). The civilian government in Pakistan under Bhutto seized the moment to strengthen Pakistan's relations with the Middle Eastern countries. He masterfully took a share in the oil-booming economy by sending the Pakistani workforce into the region. Hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis had adjusted to the emerging infrastructural needs of the Gulf States. Bhutto hoped that the newly formed ties would give his regime Islamic legitimacy just as they would buoy Pakistan's sagging economy through investments and labour remittances (Rizvi *et al.*, 2019; Nasr, 2001). At that time, Islam was in vogue in Pakistan and the Middle East due to political usage.

The Arab-Israel war and former's defeat demoralized the whole Arab world and its leadership. They were longing to revitalize their societies; in this scenario, Islam could be an excellent catalyst to recharge the Arab world and cement the Middle East's broken image. Similarly, after its defeat in the 1971 war and subsequent breakdown, Pakistan also made ideal religious passion scenarios. Historically, the Islamizing of Arabs happened after Israel defeated Egypt in the 1967 war (Ahmed, 2011). In the new situation, Saudi-Arabia emerged as the new power centre in the Middle East. Nasser's death, oil money, Faisal's ambitions, and America's changing perspective about the Gulf changed the region's whole picture. The Saudi King came forward to make a strategic alliance with Pakistan. Like Bhutto, the Shah of Iran, Qadhafi of Libya, and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia were also enthusiastic about grabbing the Muslim leadership mantle. They wanted to make an enduring partnership with Pakistan because of its non-Arab background and military power. In the aftermath of the Arab nationalism that died with the Egyptian ruler Jamal Abdel Nasser in 1972, Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies had aligned with Pakistan (Ahmed, 2011; Lodhi, 2011). This fervour of Islamic values overwhelmed the Pakistani state and society.

4.1. More Catholic than the Pope

In every way, from 1971 to 1979, Pakistan's relationship with the Muslim world was ideal. Muslim countries became the largest market of Pakistani products and exports. At that time, Pakistan was exporting its 1/3 production to Muslim countries. On the educational level, Pakistan universities received many students from Muslim countries. Pakistani schools and colleges started teaching Arabic and Persian languages to promote brotherly feelings among Pakistani students. It also helped them to get jobs in Arabic and Persian-speaking countries. Bhutto's introduction of Islamic sections in the 1973 constitution further strengthened the newly formed bond between Pakistan and Muslim Middle East. Likewise, in Pakistan's state policies, special arrangements were introduced to bring solidarity with the Muslim world. This

Arabization of the society had two-fold benefits, first to claim and associate Pakistan as part of the Middle East, and second to equip Pakistani students for future workforce needs of the developing economies of the oil-rich Gulf. The Constitution, which included all Islamic features of the earlier constitutions, made Islam directly relevant to the state and its power and authority (Syed, 1984).

The state's policies engineered public sentiments to promote brotherly sentiment among Pakistani masses that would last for decades. Since people were disappointed and dejected after the 1971 incident, Bhutto gauged society's nerves and motivated them for the Islamic cause. Further, people found plentiful economic opportunities in the Middle East, which cemented their emotions with the Arab world. It is fair to say that Bhutto capitalized on the public sentiment for a reaffirmation of Islam as a personal and national ideology. To further assert the state's Islamic identity, extensive Islamic provisions were incorporated in the 1973 constitution, which echoed earlier endeavours to emphasize Pakistan's commitment to Islam (Ellis, 1993). Article 40 of the 1973 Constitution gave a detailed explanation of Pakistan's commitment to renewed thrust on an excellent relationship with Islamic countries (The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973). As per Pande (2011), Pakistan's rulers always view Pakistan as the future leader of the Muslim world, but the irony is that it has ambition but no resources. Thus, Pakistan built economic, military, and political ties with Muslim countries worldwide, which provided them with immense symbolic and economic aid.

4.2. Bhutto's Journey of the Renaissance

Under Bhutto's vibrant leadership, Pakistan played an important role not in the third world but most significantly in the Muslim world. Bhutto persuaded the Muslim leaders on many occasions for a common cause in the Muslim world with his diplomatic skills. He consistently engaged the Muslim countries to advance Pakistan's interests and shared Muslim identity with his shuttle diplomacy. Bhutto ran a marathon of diplomatic advances to appease the Muslim world for the country's interests. He paid frequent visits to engage with several Muslim leaders to pursue the cause. The frequency of his contacts with the Muslim world was un-limited. He met with the Shah of Iran fifteen times. Besides, Bhutto visited the Saudi Arab Government four times, Turkey five times, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates both on two occasions (Burke, 1991). This 10000-mile odyssey was friendliness with Turkey, Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Just after few months, deliberating on the options, opportunities, and global environment, President Bhutto, started his 'Journey of the Renaissance' as a goodwill gesture to the Islamic world (Burke, 1991). After completing his first trip to win the Muslim countries' hearts, he visited the remaining Muslim States in the next round in May and June.

During his second marathon, Bhutto stayed in Saudi-Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mauritania, Guainía, and Nigeria. He also undertook a whirlwind tour of Islamic countries in the Middle East and Africa (Sattar, 2011). The tours were multi-purpose; its immediate objective was to provide emotional therapy and morale boost to Pakistani masses going through a war trauma. He also wanted to build a direct, personal, and stable relationship among the Muslim world's leadership. He called for a new 'organic association' to better defend their collective security needs (The U.S. Department of State, 1976). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto already worked as Pakistan's foreign minister; he envisaged and architected a new foreign policy after becoming the President and later Prime Minister of the country. He looked to liberate Pakistan from western dependence, especially American

influence that marked Pakistan as a genuinely independent country. Bhutto started a new campaign to befriend the Muslim world as Pakistan's first foreign policy priority. It was a sentimental as well as a strategic move of Pakistan. Unlike his predecessors, Bhutto had aimed to build different kinds of relationships with the Muslim world – based on bilateralism. In an unfriendly political environment, Bhutto placed Pakistan at the forefront of the Islamic world. On one occasion, he responded to such circumstances and said, "what was left to Pakistan, solidly Islamic; he further added, Pakistan formed the eastern frontier of the Muslim heartland and looked westward towards Iran and Turkey, into the Arab Middle East to Egypt and the States of North Africa" (Burke, 1991)

Burke (1991) argues that Z. A. Bhutto allied Pakistan with the Middle East and declared it part of its shared purpose and identity. He insisted on dissociating Pakistan from the Indian subcontinent for it does disconnect on identity fronts. Although the Middle Eastern countries never honoured Pakistan's claims, they deliberately remained silent to avoid controversy. As a tactical move by Pakistan to counter any further ulterior move of India to weaken it, it consciously prioritized ideological affinity with the Middle East over hard territorial realities. The Middle Eastern states were a moral and material shelter for Pakistan. On many other occasions, Pakistan consistently claimed itself as a Middle Eastern country. On the diplomatic level, Bhutto identified Pakistan as a Middle Eastern power and referred to it as the 'anchor' of the Muslim states in the Indian Ocean (Ellis, 1993). Bhutto's struggle to achieve the Middle Eastern identity for Pakistan shows that the identity and national interests dominated over the geographical intricacies.

After losing the war by Pakistan from India in 1971 and the Middle Eastern Muslim countries' setback in the 1973 War, demoralized masses required a morale boost. Thus, Bhutto placated the Muslim world and its people by declaring yet to achieve nuclear power as an 'Islamic bomb' (Nasr, 2011). Pakistani state strengthened its Islamic ties with the Muslim countries and tried to pacify its religious authorities. This deliberate use of Islam in state policies brought the Islamic authoritarian class (Mullah/Maulvi) to forefront, which ultimately captured and moulded the society's direction. Domestically, Bhutto's administration granted some concessions to the Islamic establishment, introducing the ministry of religious affairs in the central cabinet (Syed, 1984). On one occasion, Bhutto said, "There is a whole uninterrupted belt of Muslim nations, beginning with Iran and Afghanistan and culminating on the shores of Atlantic and Morocco. With the people of all these states, we share a cultural heritage, religious beliefs, and a good deal of history. There is, thus, a community of our aspirations and hopes. We must make a significant effort in building upon the fraternal ties that already bind us to the Muslim World" (Hyder, 1972).

4.3. Second OIC Summit, Time to Relive the Dreams!

The formation of OIC provided a golden chance for Pakistan to fulfil its unfulfilled dreams. Bhutto seized the opportunity and used the OIC platform as a launching pad for its strategic goals and an alternative international forum. There was little chance for Pakistan to gain favour for its fundamental issues in the Non-Aligned Movement – NAM and the United Nations – UN. For Pakistan, the Pan-Islamic quest has translated into attempts to balance India's regional hegemony by alliance-formation and, in the second instance, to increase its prestige by projecting itself as a dynamic actor on the Islamic scene (Sheikh, 2007). Pakistan was left alone in the international polity after 1971 affairs. Pakistan lagged from India on all global political platforms. In the UN, India was in a better position because of Russian support; in NAM, it

was the founding member with much influence. Therefore, Pakistan direly needed a large forum to safeguard and propagate its interests and concerns. OIC could be the best alternate for Pakistan to accomplish its objectives. Pakistan eagerly utilized the OIC as an anti-Indian instrument where it did not have to compete with its arch-foe, unlike the case within another international forum such as the UN or the NAM (Shirin, 1985; Ziring, 1980).

Bhutto was an ardent proponent of socialism (Islamic Socialism) during his political campaign; he rhetorically used the socialist philosophy to placate the country's discontented youth. Nevertheless, once Bhutto grabbed power, he changed his socialist mantra with Islamic socialism to appease the Gulf monarchies that were afraid of socialism. "The Persian Gulf states welcomed Bhutto for abandoning socialism and were keen on strengthening their ties with Pakistan based on Islamic solidarity. The government's turn to Islam, thus, also had an economic and foreign component to it (Nasr, 2001). In every aspect, the formation of OIC was a novel idea in world politics and also a new experience in modern history when countries joined together under the umbrella of a common religion. Other associations and regional blocks existed globally, but they were mostly constituted for the economic integration or defence purposes, without religion as a priority. "The very idea... a grouping, based on religious identity, might seem to modern Western observers absurd or even comic. However, it is neither absurd nor comic concerning Islam. Some fifty- six [now fifty-seven] Muslim governments, including monarchies and republics, conservatives and revolutionaries, practitioners of capitalism, and disciples of various kinds of socialism, friends, and enemies of the United States, and exponents of a whole spectrum of shades of neutrality, have built up an elaborate apparatus (Lewis, 1998). Gathering critical heads of the states in Lahore had its strategic importance, such as it sent a clear message to India that Pakistan did not stand alone anymore; instead, it was a part of an alliance of many Islamic countries, including some of the world's wealthiest nations (Shahid, 2010; Talbot, 1998).

Bhutto mesmerized the OIC leaders with his eloquence and articulation; he used Quran verses to unify the Muslim *Ummah*. He would emphatically refer to the 103 verse of *Surah Al-Imran* from the Quran that said, "And hold fast, all together, unto the bond with God, and do not draw apart from one another" (Asad, 1980). These Quranic verses were incorporated in the emblem of the OIC during its second Summit held in Lahore. Pakistan skilfully used the 1974 OIC summit to attract the Muslim world to discuss its causes. Pakistan showed the fullest solidarity with the Arab world not only against the Zionist designs against the Palestine but also against the other Arab countries. This gesture brought the two parts of the Muslim world together for future cooperation. The Palestine question was the Achilles' heel for the Arabs; one could quickly appease them by using this card. Similarly, the OIC summit gave Pakistan ample opportunities to use this moment to create lasting bonds with the Arab states. The literature also supports the notion that on two occasions – the 1973 Arab-Israel War and the Second OIC Summit in 1974, Pakistan and the Middle Eastern state's political links have been prominently focused (Mustafa, 1975).

Bhutto advised the leaders of the Muslim world that the booming oil economy could provide the Arabs a prospect to play an essential role in the Muslim world and the llobal politics. Their new confidence with oil resources and being a part of strategically vital the Middle East was enough to demand their share in the decision-making process. Z. A Bhutto (1970) stated this goal as, "The Muslim countries are now so placed as to be able to play a most constructive and rewarding role for cooperation among themselves and with other countries of the third world. They possess a common heritage and outlook, and their economies are such as to enable them

to supplement each other's development efforts. We translate the sentiment of Islamic unity into concrete measures." Bhutto's grandiloquence made him a popular leader in the Muslim world and the Third world. Moreover, Bhutto also pacified the Arab people and leaders by declaring that Jerusalem is historically a part of Muslims. Bhutto's famous words say, "Except for an interval during the crusade {sic}, Jerusalem has been a Muslim city. I repeat a Muslim city. At no cost shall we compromise against it, and Pakistan is uncompromisingly committed to the Arab cause" (Wolpert, 1993). He assured the Arab leaders that Pakistan is committed to every cause of the Arab world and no power would deviate her devotion to this goal. Z. A. Bhutto described the Muslim world as 'mid-most nation; this position imposed a special responsibility on the Muslim states to strive towards the realization of the worldwide equity and justice (Bhutto, 1976).

The successful holding of the 2nd OIC summit in Pakistan in 1974 had both symbolic and concrete values. It boosted Pakistan's morale and sent out a message to the world that Muslim countries side with Pakistan. Rizvi (1993) deems this support beneficial to Pakistan for counterbalancing India's military ascendancy in the regional power structure during the post-Bangladesh war period. Bhutto successfully hosted the second Islamic Summit, which marked Pakistan's ideological affinity and deep identity credentials with the Muslim world. In a similar vein of argument, Shahid (2010) argues that the successful holding of the Islamic Summit at Lahore in 1974 by Prime Minister Bhutto reaffirmed Pakistan's continued importance in the Islamic world morale-booster for the Pakistani people. All around the Muslim nations, thirty-five heads of state or high-level representatives and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) attended the Summit.

As Chairman of the OIC Summit, Z. A. Bhutto had the opportunity to address the variety of Muslim world problems and prospects. He again reiterated the Summit's objectives and said: "Peace, not war, and balanced world order for all people" (Bhutto, 1976). Pakistan's foreign policy re-orientation coincided with the Islamic world's renaissance and the Gulf countries' importance in OPEC's backbone. For being the largest oil-producing block, the Muslim countries of Middle East enjoyed unprecedented leverage in the world affairs at the time. Now Muslim states could no longer be taken for granted and ignored. Pakistan worked extremely hard for Muslim solidarity. Although Pakistan's work was verbal so far, soon, she must show her commitment to the Muslim cause. At the end of the 2nd Islamic Summit, the Muslim leaders pledged to build a future framework to promote more political and economic cooperation among the Muslim states. They also reaffirmed that the prosperous Islamic countries' duty, especially the oil-rich Gulf States, to assist the poor Muslim countries. Pakistan's Prime Minister – Z. A. Bhutto, proposed, and the other leaders duly agreed to form the Committees of Representatives and set up Islamic Solidarity Funds to enhance the cultural and materials collaboration between member states. Pakistan also convincingly forwarded the idea of Islamic Development Bank (IDB), and all other Finance Ministers endorsed it. The initial amount of the bank was 2 billion dollars, and these funds were mostly contributed by the oil-rich counties. In February 1974, Z. A. Bhutto hosted a summit meeting of the World's Muslim leaders in Lahore. The conference lasted for three days and was attended by the representatives of the thirty-seven countries (Bhutto, 1976).

In January 1977, Pakistan successfully organized the newly established Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural, and Social Affairs pioneering meeting. Once again, on this new forum, Pakistan demonstrated its solidarity with the Islamic world. This commission further approved many programs ranging from food and agriculture, money and finance, transfer of resources,

and industrialization and technology. In all such activities, Pakistan's primary objective was to amalgamate the Muslim interests and share Muslim resources to better the Muslim masses. Pakistan promoted bilateralism agenda among its Muslim partners to reduce the widened cleavages of rivalry between different Muslim countries and create an encouraging environment to safeguard collective interests. The Following affirmative arrangements facilitated the movements of millions of Pakistani labourers in the Gulf States. These Pakistani expatriates' remittances were the primary source of Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves (Burki, 1984). After the OIC Summit, Pakistan's symbolic appeal to Islam became more vivid. It sponsored the International *Seerah* (Life of the Prophet) Conference in 1976, commissioned an 'error-free' Quran, and relaxed regulations on governing pilgrimage (Hajj). It also made Arabic a component of the educational curricula and increased the Islamic theology and history components, and changed the national holiday from Sunday to Friday. Pakistan also changed the name of Pakistan Red Cross to the Red Crescent, empowered the Islamic Ideology Council that had become dormant, and established the Ministry of Religious Affairs at the federal level to formalize and regulate the relations between the state and the *Ulema* (religious leaders) and Islamists (Mujawar, 1996; Shah, 1996).

4.4. The Middle East Oil's Jackpot

An increase in oil prices suddenly multiplied the position of the oil-rich Arab states globally. It also gave a sense of pride to other Muslim states that got an opportunity to boast. The increase in oil prices, in the meantime, greatly enhanced the attraction of the oil-rich countries in the Muslim world. However, Pakistan's relationship with the Middle Eastern Muslim states dates back even before Pakistan's creation. For the Indo-Pak subcontinent people, the Arab world, due to religious commonality and being a centre of Islam, commands respect. Pakistan's friendship with the Arabs pre-dates the discovery of oil in most of the Arab countries and certainly pre-dates the oil boom. The motive for this friendship was mainly ideological. "Pakistan's friendship with the Arabs has also brought tangible benefits in the economic field and terms of diplomatic and material support, consisting of economic aid and human resources" (Shahid, 2010). Pakistan's overtures with the Arab world further strengthened owing to economic interests connected with oil money.

Pakistan's diplomatic prelude with the Middle East cemented Pakistan's identity requirements and fulfilled its much-required financial and economic interests. Pakistan was an essential recipient of overseas Pakistani's remittances from Gulf countries. "The remittances from the Pakistanis working abroad (Middle East) have become the single largest source of foreign exchange earnings, and the most crucial benefit of Pakistan's ties with the Middle East has been the absorption of Pakistani workforce in the oil-rich Gulf states (Rizvi, 1993). In terms of aid, grants, and loans, Pakistan received a handsome amount from brother Muslim countries. The Muslim world generally and the Middle Eastern Muslim countries specifically supported Pakistan to survive and move forward economically. They also helped Pakistan morally, politically, and financially. It gave Pakistan the much-needed confidence to rebuild its regional and international stature severely damaged after the 1971 catastrophe. "It would be no exaggeration to suggest that the Muslim's world support of Pakistan helped to restore its confidence after the 1971 debacle and improved Pakistan's position during the settlement processes of the problems resulting from the 1971 war" (Rizvi, 1993).

Before 1972, the economic conditions of Middle East countries were not sound. Nevertheless, this equation changed when the oil prices boosted after the 1973 Arab-Israel war and the

increased oil demands, filled their exchequers with money. Since the oil boom, Pakistan was the "Prime recipient of aid from oil countries" (Mustafa, 1975). Pakistan gained hard cash from the Middle East, but other fields like agriculture and exporting human resources also got tangible success. The export of agricultural products and industrial goods to the Middle East increased eleven times during 1972-75 (Khan, 1982). Additionally, Pakistan's trade volume increased with the Middle Eastern countries after the petrol prices' surge in the early 1970s. Mustafa (1975) argued that trade between Pakistan and the Middle East demonstrated a change in the pattern with increased oil prices. Pakistan's imports and exports alone accounted for nearly a fifth of its total trade; and, Pakistan has set up joint commissions with six Middle Eastern states to facilitate and expedite economic cooperation viz. Iran, Libya, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey".

Pakistan under Bhutto also tried its best to build a vibrant economy of the state by experiencing different ideas. The ever-increasing remittances from the Arab economies reinforced the national economy and created a new middle class. According to scholars, the Pakistani workforce's hard-earned remittances abroad would significantly bolster Pakistan's economy (Bean, 1966). With increasing remittances, Pakistan's exchequer was receiving. In 1977-78, they brought in remittances totalling more than \$1.1 billion (about twice the monetary amount of Pakistan's service on its foreign debt) and equalling seventy-nine percent of the deficit-on-trade account (Isabella, 1984). All this new money helped Pakistan minimize its trade deficit and pay back its foreign debt servicing.

Pakistan's exports to the Middle Eastern states enhanced dramatically after 1974. "In 1970-71, before the loss of East Pakistan, exports to the region amounted to 12 percent of total exports while in 1974-75 it was 25 percent (Gustafson, 1974). It further increased in the coming years. It is also interesting to note that before 1974 Pakistan did not receive any financial aid from the Arab countries. The economic assistance started pouring in after the 1973 Arab-Israel war and the OIC Summit's successful holding. The main reason for the new change was Bhutto. "Before 1974, Islamabad had not received direct financial aid from any Arab country, and with a single stroke, Bhutto had changed that, and Arab oil ad money started flowing (Vatanka, 2015). Just after that, by August 1974, it would even sign off on a \$10 million loan for economic development from tiny Qatar, which, with a population of some 50,000 in those days, was the smallest country in the Middle East (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1975). Furthermore, the masterstroke of forming OPEC provided a powerful setup to the Arab states and the whole Muslim world. "The activation of a moribund OPEC by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and its dramatic emergence as the world's most influential international cartel almost overnight made previously minor nations into virtual economic superpowers (Hveem, 1978).

4.5. Economic Imbalance versus Strategic Imbalance

Oil production brought wealth and prosperity on the one hand and enhanced insecurities of monarchs and dictators in the Middle East on the other. Regional and international politics demanded more appropriate defence measures and to hold down internal and external threats. Thus, Pakistan's professional army with a non-Arab background was the immediate remedy to such threats. It was a kind of barter system; the Arab's provided Pakistan economic support; in return, Pakistan provided them the needed security services. From the period (1971-79), there was a growing realization on the part of policymakers in Pakistan and the Middle East that their defence is interconnected and interdependent due to geographical proximity. Such sharing of views on international issues brought closer linkages and a shared understanding of the growing

pressure from the extra-regional influences in their countries. One of Pakistan's most critical sections with the Muslim world was the additional military cooperation agreements with the various Arab countries. With these agreements, Pakistan became an important strategic partner of many important Muslim countries. The Pakistan military was known for discipline and professionalism, and it had sufficient experience of handling American weapons, which the Gulf States were also using. Moreover, Pakistani military advisers' shared religious background made them more acceptable in the Gulf countries (Hasan, 1983).

From 1972 to 1977, Pakistan successfully signed military assistance and cooperation agreements and protocols with Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. It also provided access to military installations and services to Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Qatar, Syria, Sudan, and Turkey (Burke, 1991). Several defence pacts and protocols are vital in terms of security and strategic relationship that has multiplied Pakistan's importance in the Muslim world's eyes. Under the following protocols, Pakistan provided internal and external support to the partner countries in the military training facilities. Pakistan sent its armed forces to help the Brethren Muslim states during their domestic unrest and conflicts. Pakistan also deployed special contingent missions to Arab countries. In strategic cooperation, Saudi-Arabia is the principal strategic partner of Pakistan. Another important country is Oman, who, after the British departure from the Gulf, filled the space with the Pakistan army permanently stationed on her soil or directly recruited Baloch people from Pakistan's coastal areas to serve her royal arm. Pakistan neither entered into any security treaty with the Gulf States nor joined the newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, Pakistan maintained close contacts on the defence and security affairs at bilateral level (Hasan, 1992).

Pakistan proved a friend in need because it helped Middle Eastern countries in their hard times. For example, during the 1973 Arab-Israel war, Pakistan supplied small arms, weapons, and other 'useful help to these countries (Bhargava, 1983). Simultaneously, Pakistan also obtained Western arms by following Muslim countries' help. It was the ripe time (1971-79) for Pakistan's special affairs and relationship with the Islamic world. Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan was a close friend of the Shah of Iran, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, and Colonel Qaddafi of Libya. The interesting thing is that they all, in one sense or another, disliked each other due to different reasons. However, Bhutto skilfully benefited from all. Supposedly, Bhutto, along with the Shah of Iran and Qaddafi, planned for an Islamic bomb to safeguard the Muslim world's insecurities and interests. On several occasions, Pakistan's leadership reaffirmed its commitment to build an 'Islamic Bomb' for its security quest against India.

Pakistan utilized its geographical position on the Persian Gulf's edge and its proximity with Iran and Central Asia to smoothen its ties with the Muslim world, by and large. Pakistan occupied a vital position in Iran's strategic planning, on the one hand, and the Arabs on the other (Mustafa, 1975). Because of its strategic location, Pakistan always claimed that it could bridge the warring Arabs and the Iranian world, but it never succeeded. The strategic links between Pakistan and the Arab Muslim world were the most critical aspects of these newly charged love affairs. Moreover, the nuke race between the two superpowers amplified the sense of insecurity among the big and small states alike. Hence, the Muslim world also felt vulnerable, and this susceptibility brought Pakistan more closely to its brothers in religion – Arab countries. Finally, a necessary strategic compulsion that has brought Pakistan and the Middle Eastern states together is the threat of nuclear weapons and big power rivalry in the region (Kukreja, 2003; Mustafa, 1975).

5. Conclusion

Pakistan was created in 1947 with two wings as East and West Pakistan, but partitioned in 1971 into two independent states i.e., Pakistan and Bangladesh. The new Pakistan that emerged after the separation tragedy needed to overhaul its identity and interests. East Pakistan's loss obviated the need for bridge-building between disparate communities and centred attention on constructing Pakistan that was more akin to Islamic doctrine and precept than that suggested by its founding father's secular vision. Moreover, the new Pakistan required a different geopolitical orientation. Pakistan no longer anchored in South Asia; it was more attached to the Middle Eastern Muslim states to build strong Muslim identity and fraternal ties with the Muslim countries of Middle East. In new circumstances, Bhutto hoped that his personal and governmental ties with the Middle Eastern Muslim countries would give his country and regime Islamic legitimacy and economic gain that he dearly needed. This time, the Middle Eastern states did not disappoint Pakistan's leadership and people. Due to the oil boom, the Middle East countries' economic prosperity helped Pakistan with every possible means. Pakistan provided them military assistance, which they required to overcome their internal and external security problems. It was a marriage of convenience sort of arrangement between the partners. Pakistan's diplomatic lead with the Middle East fulfilled its identity needs and addressed its much needed financial and economic interests. Thus, Pakistan successfully used this situation to fulfil its dream of pan-Islamism and the Islamic Identity. Pakistan essentially concentrated on rebuilding its international and regional stature that bitterly shattered after 1971, in which it partially succeeded.

References

- Ahmed, K. (2011). *Sectarian war: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia violence and its link to the Middle East*. Oxford University.
- Asad, M. (1980). The Qur'an (3:103). *The Message of the Qur'an*. (Translation). Dar al-Andlus. <http://www.muhammad-asad.com/Message-of-Quran.pdf>
- Bean, L. L. (1967). *Demographic aspects of potential labour force growth in Pakistan*. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
- Bennett-Jones, O. (2020). *The Bhutto dynasty the struggle for power in Pakistan*. Yale University.
- Bhargava, G. S. (1983). *South Asian security after Afghanistan*. Lexington Books.
- Bhutto, Z. A. (1976). *Thoughts on some aspects of Islam*. Reproduced by S. H. Panhwar. <http://sanipanhwar.com/Thoughts%20on%20some%20aspects%20of%20Islam%20by%20Zulfikar%20Ali%20Bhutto.pdf>
- Bhutto, Z. A. (1977). *The Third World: New Directions*. Quartet Books.
- Burke, S. M. (1991). *Pakistan's foreign policy: an historical analysis* (2nd Ed.). Oxford University.
- Burki, S. J. (1984). International migration: implications for labour exporting countries. *Middle East Journal*, 38(4), 668-684. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4326922>
- Cohen, S. P. (2006). *The idea of Pakistan*. Oxford University.
- Devji, F. (2013, September 30). *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a political idea*. Harvard University.
- Ellis, K. C. (1993). *Pakistan foreign policy: alternative approaches*, (ed.). In Hafeez Malik, *Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation*. The McMillian.
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1975. National Archives: Commonwealth Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: South Asia Department: Registered Files (S and

- FS Series). File FCO 37/1658, FSP 2/2, 1975. <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C15095>
- Gustafson, W. E. (1976). Economic problems of Pakistan under Bhutto. *Asian Survey*, 16(4), 364-380. <http://lcwu.edu.pk/ocd/cfiles/History/Min/His/202/ECONOMICREFORMSOFBHUTTO.pdf>
- Hyder, K. (1972, November 1). Pakistan under Bhutto. *Current History*, 63(375), 202. <https://search.proquest.com/openview/cea207602adb770878be52f821420c0/1.pdf?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=1816367>
- Hveem, H. (1978). *The political economy of third world producer associations*. Columbia University.
- Iqbal, J. (2003). *Islam and Pakistan's Identity*. Iqbal Academy Pakistan and Vanguard. <https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/932615>
- Jalal, A. (2014, September 16). *The struggle for Pakistan: a Muslim homeland and global politics* (First Edition). Harvard University. <https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674979833>
- Khan, R. A. (1982, September 16). *Security in the Gulf: Pakistani Perspective-II*. The Muslim, Islamabad.
- Kukreja, V. (2003). *Contemporary Pakistan: political processes, conflicts, and crises*. Sage.
- Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985). *Hegemony, and socialist strategy*. Verso.
- Lewis, B. (1998). *The multiple identities of the Middle East*. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Lieven, A. (2011). *Pakistan: a hard country*. Public Affairs.
- Lodhi, M. (2011). *Pakistan beyond the crisis state* (ed.). Oxford University.
- Mujawar, S. H. S. (1996). *Religion and politics in Pakistan, 1972-88*. Quaid-I-Azam University.
- Mustafa, Z. (1975). Recent trends in Pakistan's policy towards the Middle East. *Pakistan Horizon*, 28(4), 1-17. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394759>
- Nasr, S. A. R. (2001). *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the making of state power*. Oxford University.
- Pande, A. (2011). *Explaining Pakistan's foreign policy: escaping India*, (1st Edition). Routledge, Contemporary South Asia.
- Raja, M. A. (2010). *Constructing Pakistan: foundational texts and the rise of Muslim national identity, 1857-1947*. Oxford University.
- Rizvi, H. A. (1993). *Pakistan and the geostrategic environment: a study of foreign policy*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rizvi, S. Z. A., Jamil, S., & Shaikh, A. I. (2019). Diaspora, remittances and dependence on Arab countries: a case of Pakistan. *Liberal Arts & Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ)*, 3(2), 74-84. <https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.lassij/3.2.10>
- Sattar, A. (2011). *Pakistan's foreign policy 1947-2009: a concise history*. Oxford University.
- Shaikh, F. (2009). *Making sense of Pakistan*. Columbia University.
- Shah, S. M. H. (1996). *Religion and politics in Pakistan, 1972-88*. National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-I-Azam University.
- Shahid, M. A. (2000). *Pakistan's foreign policy: a reappraisal* (2nd Edition). Oxford University.
- Sheikh, N. S. (2007). *The new politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic foreign policy in a world of states* (1st Edition). Routledge Islamic Studies Series.
- Shirin, T. K. & (1985). *In search of an identity: Islam and Pakistan's foreign policy*. In Aheed Dawisha, *Islam in Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University.

- Svante, E. C. (2006). *Pakistan foreign policy: Islamic or Pragmatic*. In Brenda Shaffer (ed.). *The limits of culture: Islam and foreign policy*. The MIT Press.
- Syed, A. H. (1984). *Pakistan, Islam, politics and national solidarity*, Vanguard.
- Talbot, I. (1998). *Pakistan: a modern history*. C. Hurst & Co.
- The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1549886415_632.pdf
- The U.S. Department of State, 1976. Executive Order N/A or blank, April 20, 1976.
- Vatanka, A. (2015). *Iran and Pakistan: security, diplomacy and American influence*, I. B. Tauris & Co.
- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge University.
- Wertz, F. J. (2011). *Five ways of doing qualitative analysis: phenomenological psychology, grounded theory, discourse analysis, narrative research, and intuitive inquiry*. Guilford Press.
- Wolpert, S. (1993). *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: his life and times*. Oxford University.
- Wood, L. A., & Kroger, R. O. (2000). *Doing discourse analysis: methods for studying action in talk and text*. Sage. <http://sk.sagepub.com/books/doing-discourse-analysis>
- Ziring, L. (1980). *Pakistan: the enigma of political development*. Dawson Westview.