

## A qualitative study of the factors driving the temporary migration of workers from the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan to Saudi Arabia

Muhammad Rafiq<sup>1</sup> | Muhammad Saeed\*<sup>2</sup> | Muhammad Israr<sup>3</sup>

1. Department of Management and Information System, Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University, Saudi Arabia.

2. Department of Global Studies, King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals, Saudi Arabia.

3. Department of Sociology, Shaheed Benazir Bhutto University, Sheringal, Dir Upper, Pakistan.

\*Corresponding Author Emails: [saeeddir@gmail.com](mailto:saeeddir@gmail.com) | [msaeedpk@kfupm.edu.sa](mailto:msaeedpk@kfupm.edu.sa)

Received: January 3, 2022

Accepted: April 5, 2022

Published: April 21, 2022

### Abstract

This study aims to explore the drivers of the temporary migration of workers from the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. Nearly two million Pakistanis work and live in Saudi Arabia; however, no such research has been conducted to study and configure their migration drivers. This research attempts to fill this gap. Data was qualitatively elicited from 90 workers in different cities of Saudi Arabia. The analysis depicts that a complex combination of the push-pull drivers such as poverty (96.66 %), un/employment (95 %), income/wage differentials (85%), family and peer pressure (80%), strong networks of relatives (76.66 %), desire to change the social status (68.33 %), turbulent environment (65 %), and religious affiliations and connectedness (95 %) provoke migration to Saudi Arabia. This study posits that the recent socioeconomic changes in Saudi Arabia, specifically the Saudization policy, quickly alter the economic migration inflow. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia will remain the top destination for religious migration.

**Keywords:** Pakhtun migrants, Dir Lower, migration, drivers of migration, pull-push factors, economic migration, religious migration.

### How to Cite:

Rafiq, M., Saeed, M., & Israr, M. (2022). A qualitative study of the factors driving the temporary migration of workers from the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. *Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences (JHSMS)*, 3(1), 169-186. <https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.jhsms/3.1.12>

**Publisher's Note:** IDEA PUBLISHERS (IDEA Publications Group) stands neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in the published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2022 The Author(s), published by IDEA PUBLISHERS (IDEA Publications Group).

**Licensing:** This is an Open Access article published under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>)



## 1. Introduction

Saudi Arabia is the top destination for Pakistani migrant workers (De Bel-Air, 2015). Of Pakistanis who travelled abroad, about 96 % of them went to the GCC countries. Further, more than 80 % of these migrants went to two countries, 50.90 % to Saudi Arabia and 33.10 % to UAE (Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment, 2016). Notably, every fourth Pakistani who goes abroad belongs to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province (Amjad & Arif, 2014). It is interesting to note that KP has a much larger share (24.65 %) in the annual outflows of workers than its total (13%) share in the country's population (Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment, 2016). As the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) hosts the highest number of Pakhtun-Pakistani migrants, who contribute to both countries' social and economic development, it was essential to explore, understand and map out the drivers provoking their temporary migration. Furthermore, the Pakistani community, the second-largest migrant community in KSA and UAE, has primarily been the least researched in terms of scholarship on migration (Errichiello & Nyhagen, 2021).

Specifically, there is no research on the drivers of migration from KP to Saudi Arabia. This study, therefore, attempts to provide a good body of literature and original insights about the pattern and determinants instigating the outmigration of Pakhtun-Pakistanis to Saudi Arabia.

## 2. Literature review

Different frameworks explain the origins, patterns, and characteristics of international migration. However, all these frameworks could be deduced from Revensteins' (Ravenstein, 1885; 1889) "push-pull" forces of migration in the sending and receiving destinations (Velazquez, 2000). The "pull" factors in the destination countries, such as higher wages, employment, better welfare systems, and the "push" factors such as lower wages, high unemployment and underemployment rates, slow economic growth or economic stagnation, and poverty explicate the inception and perpetuation of international migration (Velazquez, 2000). However, Lee (1966) argues that migration is a selective process. Many differentials such as age, gender, education, knowledge, and cultural ties with the destination population and social class also shape the push-pull drivers and configure the conditions within which people choose to migrate. Notably, the recent reformulation of Revenstein's framework by Van Hear *et al.* (2018) through the "push-pull plus" provides a plausible explanation of the drivers of international migration. For example, it classifies the drivers of migration into four intertwining and mutually inclusive categories predisposing, proximate, precipitating, and mediating drivers (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018).

In the view of Van Hear *et al.* (2018), the predisposing drivers germinate from the structural disparities between the origin and destination place of the migrants. These drivers usually are shaped by the global macro-political economy and its inequalities manifested: for example, (1) in the unequal outcomes of broad processes such as globalization, environmental change, urbanization, and demographic transformation; (2) economic disparities such as differences in earnings, livelihoods and living standards; (3) political disparities—created by the relative prevalence of conflict, persecution and other dimensions of human rights and human security; (4) environmental disparities which include the presence or absence of resources, the relative fertility of the soil, water availability and the extent of forest cover; (5) geographical factors – not least, proximity to borders and the desired destination.

The proximate drivers in the places of origin emanate from the above-mentioned structural features (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018). For example, these include economic, or business cycle downturns, worse security or human rights environments generated by repression or a power struggle, large-scale development projects that involve displacement, and marked environmental degeneration. Further, the destinations' drivers may include the economic upturn or broader societal improvement, employment opportunities, business development, the pursuit of trade, and new educational opportunities. However, the predisposing drivers may also act as proximate drivers entailing any economic, political, and environmental disparities and disparities in human security (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018).

The precipitating drivers tangled with the identifiable event(s) induce individuals and households to migrate or stay (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018). For example, these might relate to the economic sphere, such as a financial crisis, a drastic rise in unemployment, a factory closure, a collapse in farm prices, the imposition of punitive taxation, or the disintegration of health and education or other welfare services. Further, they may relate to the political/security sphere, involving persecution, disputed citizenship, conflict escalation, massacre, and an outbreak of war and invasion. Similarly, natural or environmental calamities such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods can also precipitate the migration of populations. However, on the destination or pull side, new employment opportunities, a conducive environment for small businesses, relaxation of immigration controls, and family reunion regulations may precipitate migration (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018).

Finally, the mediating drivers enable, facilitate, constrain, accelerate and consolidate migration or diminish migration (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018). The stimulating mediating drivers may include the prevalence of transportation, communications, information systems, and emigration policies required for the journey and transit period. However, the constraining drivers of migration may include the absence of such infrastructure and the lack of information and governing emigration policies (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018). However, policies and practices in other areas such as ease of doing trade, ownership rights, housing, integration and absorption in the local community, education, and justice system are likely to enable, facilitate, or constrain migration (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018).

Previous research studies also mention the migrant networks in origin and destination places as a strong mediating driver of migration (Bakewell *et al.*, 2016). For example, suppose the decision to move is determined by precipitating drivers. A complex combination of such drives configures the conditions and circumstances within which people choose to migrate (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018). For example, these mediating drivers influence the desire to move, how and when to move, which household member should go abroad, and where to move (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018). It is challenging to establish when and why some drivers are more important than others, which types of combinations are more forceful than others, and which are more vulnerable to change through external intervention (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018). Thus, the drivers are structural elements that either enable or constrain the exercise of agency by the social actors (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018).

De La Garza and Rodolfo (2010) state that labor market conditions featured by wage and labor demand differentials between home and destination countries influence labor flow. Massey *et al.* (1993) consider migration a rational choice of the actors and their families, based on a thorough calculation of the costs and benefits analysis. Kumari and Shamim (2007) argue that

migration is often a family strategy where parents send their sons abroad to expect a monetary return for their investment. Prior (1979) argues that international migration towards industrial nations is increased either the demand for foreign labor or the unwillingness of the local population to accept specific jobs considered lower in status and respect. It implies that foreign workers easily take such lower and more complex assignments in such conditions because they do not consider themselves part of the receiving country and feel no such guilt in taking lower status jobs. Instead, working and sending money home gives them more honor and prestige than job prestige in oil-rich countries (De La Garza & Rodolfo, 2010).

### **3. Methodology of the study**

This study used qualitative methodology for data elicitation. It enables a researcher to get a deeper insight into how the social world is experienced, perceived, interpreted and reproduced by informants (Creswell & Clark, 2017). The study was conducted in the three migrant concentrated regions of Saudi Arabia such as Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dammam. The study participants were recruited from Dir Upper, Dir Lower, and Swat districts of KP for two reasons: a) they constitute the highest number of migrant workers in KSA (around 0.3 million) as per the data of the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment from 2010 to 2017; b) the researcher's insider identity hailing from Dir and his immense familiarity with Swat could help access and recruit the study participants. Ninety research participants, 30 in each region (20 for individual face-to-face interviews and 10 for FGDs), were selected for the study through the purposive and snowballing sampling technique. Purposive sampling helps choose highly informed participants and is relevant to the study (Palinkas *et al.*, 2015). Further, FGD can help elicit data from a selected group of individuals rather than from a statistically representative sample of a broader population (Nyumba *et al.*, 2018).

A predetermined set of questions, consisting of the following two main questions, was used for data collection.

Q no. 1. What pushed you to come to Saudi Arabia for work?

Q no. 2. What attractions pulled you to come to Saudi Arabia for work?

However, several probing questions and follow-up questions were asked throughout the interview process. The data was conducted in the Pashto language and then transcribed to English. The whole research process adhered to the ethical guidelines. For example, ethical clearance for this research was obtained from King Fahd's University Research Committee. However, as per the cultural norms of the Pakthuns and the complexity involved in signing the written consent, as explained by a study by Saeed and Griffin (2019), oral consent for the interview, recording, and use of the data were sought from all the participants. Similarly, pseudo and coded names were used to intact the anonymity and confidentiality of the informants according to the requirements of research ethics.

### **4. Study findings and discussion**

The structural method of inductive data analysis based on the thematic analysis technique was used (Moustakas, 1994). As a result, eight broader themes about the push-pull drivers of migration emerged. Besides the detailed analysis of each theme, the following section also illustrates accounts of the research participants.

#### 4.1. The penurious conditions of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provoke the migration of workers

Nearly all the respondents (96.66 %) mentioned poverty being the prime factor provoking their migration to Saudi Arabia. For example, Ijaz Khan, a mason from district Dir Upper, said:

“Our destitute conditions (ghareebaie) have compelled us to come to Saudi Arabia for work.”

Pakistan is a developing country of South Asia drowning in poverty. Pakistan was ranked 147<sup>th</sup> out of 170 impoverished countries (United Nations Development Program, 2015). Approximately 40 percent of the population in Pakistan lives in penurious conditions (Nelson, 2018; Rana, 2016). This study validates the above-mentioned facts as the main pushing factor of migration. For example, echoing this, Sajjad Khan, a taxi driver in Jeddah from district Dir Lower, stated:

“...It is not the land of my uncle...we are staying here only and only to get rid of our poor living conditions back home.”

Sajjad Khan's statement "not the land of my uncle" depicts his feelings of ownership of Saudi Arabia. Likewise, for many respondents, Saudi Arabia was not a place of enjoyment but a place of hard labour and a source of escaping poverty back home. For example, Amjad Ali, who worked as a Scofield worker for more than 15 years in Riyadh, said:

“Nobody comes here for the enjoyment...poverty has brought us here. By God, none of us would have taken a step towards Saudi Arabia if we could have had enough earning and sustenance in Pakistan.”

Likewise, another respondent, Latif Shah, an exterior stone decoration worker in Jeddah, said:

“Well! A person is not crazy to leave his small kids and family behind and go abroad...I have come to Saudi Arabia because of (ghareebi) poverty.”

Latif's proclamation demonstrates that migration is a tough choice because leaving small kids and wives behind for two to three years was a painful experience. However, the “ghareebi” (poverty) forced him and others to move for work at KSA. These respondents' views align with the findings of research studies, reporting poverty as the primary driver of outmigration for the poor regions. For example, Van Hear *et al.* (2018) identified poverty being a key structural driver of outmigration. Similarly, Martin and Sirkeci (2017) found poverty the main reason to migrate and that remittances helped reduce poverty. Thus there exists a significant interrelationship between migration, remittances, and poverty reduction in South-Asian countries (Maimbo & Ratha, 2005), Latin America (Acosta *et al.*, 2008), and low and middle-income economies (Adams & Page, 2005).

Studies have reported that migration helped reduce Pakistan's poverty. For example, Middle East migration resulted in the 24.3 percent decline in poverty headcount in 2015-16 from 50.4 percent in 2005-06 (Hyder, 2017; Jamal, 2021). Pakistani migrants remitted \$21 billion in 2018, equal to 7 percent of GDP (Imran *et al.*, 2020). However, being the second-largest

exporter of workers after the Punjab province (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2019), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has a significant share in these remittances (Amjad & Arif, 2014, Ullah *et al.*, 2018). This study argues that district Dir and Swat of KP, the most impoverished regions and highest labour exporter to Saudi Arabia, heavily depends on remittances to escape abject poverty.

#### **4.2. High unemployment, unproductive and less income-generating jobs in Pakistan drives migration to Saudi Arabia**

Pakistan has a 5.8 % unemployment rate (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2019). However, it is the highest (11.56 %) among the youth (20 to 24 years) population, which constitutes 60 % of the total population (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Further, the unemployment in KP is the highest in Pakistan, i.e., 7.3 % in 2019-20 (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where 83 percent population lives in rural areas, is the least developed and crisis-prone region in Pakistan (World Bank, 2013). Thus, migration and poverty nexus is significantly associated with unemployment and scarcity of income-generating resources in Pakistan (Yousaf & Ali, 2014). The current study validates the above-mentioned proximate drivers for migration. For example, 57 out of 60 (95%) participants considered unemployment the second leading pushing driver of their migration to the KSA. For instance, Said Alam, a plumber in Jiddah hailing from the Shamoozo region of Swat district, said:

“...if there had been employment and work (roozgar ao kar) in Pakistan, we would not have come to Saudi Arabia.”

Other respondents reiterated it. Different regions of the developing world demonstrate a similar milieu. For example (Rahim *et al.*, 2017) identified high unemployment (5.9 %) in 2014 being the push factor and remittance as the pull factor of the Indonesian migration to Malaysia. Likewise, calculations based on data drawn from the SAHWA Youth Survey (2016) indicate that most of the youth in MENA countries state that the lack of professional opportunities (unemployment or underemployment) is the number one reason to emigrate (Dibeh *et al.*, 2019). More employment opportunities in receiving countries attract migrants (Velazquez, 2000).

Conversely, some respondents were not satisfied with the jobs in Pakistan because it would not generate enough money for it as it does by the work in Saudi Arabia. For example, Saqib Khan, an office assistant in a company in Riyadh, mentioned:

“I tried my best to find some good work in Pakistan, but you know work in Pakistan is worthless (bekar) and tasteless (khwand ye nishta). So I then thought to test my luck in Saudi Arabia. I was hopeful that Saudi Arabia would turn my fortune as it has turned for many like me.”

Saqib Khan had a computer diploma and tried to get an excellent job to generate a handsome amount of money and sustain his family's life. He worked as a computer assistant in a private school but was not satisfied with it and called it "worthless" and tasteless (*bekar ao bemaza*) work, so he opted to move to Saudi Arabia five years ago. He luckily got a job in a private firm that was generating an income equivalent to the salary of a university professor in Pakistan, mentioned by him. Many people in his area had earned a good fortune from Saudi Arabia, had

established businesses, and enjoyed a prosperous life back home, inspiring the Saquib's movement to KSA.

This study agrees that work status is a variable that affects migration intentions in many ways (Dibeh *et al.*, 2019). For example, being unemployed or not satisfied with the work may trigger thoughts of moving abroad (Rahim *et al.*, 2017). The neoclassical approach also validates these views that cost-benefit analysis of the work condition entices individuals to migrate (Massey *et al.*, 1994). Likewise, the economic theory of migration expounds that people tend to relocate when the expected economic opportunities in the host country could improve their income and wealth (Buehn & Eichler, 2013). Besides, many respondents considered nepotism, corruption, the lack of solid reference, and the desired qualification constraining factors for getting employment in Pakistan.

#### **4.3. Income and wage differentials provoke the migration of workers from KP to Saudi Arabia**

A considerable number of respondents, 51 out of 60 (85%), mentioned lower wages, little return for work, and the constant deflation of Pakistani currency motivated them to migrate to Saudi Arabia. They mentioned that high salaries and stable Saudi Riyal pulled them to Saudi Arabia. For example, Jehangir, a water tank driver in Riyadh from Lower Dir, said:

“...how hard you work in Pakistan... you cannot earn a good living with it...here in KSA, the return of one day is equal to more than a week work in Pakistan.”

Echoing it, another respondent, Shakir Khan, did some calculations of both countries' weekly income differentials. For example, he mentioned that he used to get PKR 500 per day for work from 8 am to 4 pm in Pakistan. However, in Saudi, he said he gets SR. 120 per day, equal to 7 days of work income in Pakistan.

Besides, some respondents mentioned that Saudi employment and income enabled them to sustain life in Pakistan's high price hikes and inflation. For example, Suliman Shah, a taxi driver in Dammam, told:

“Brother! There is a high price hike in Pakistan...You cannot fight high price hikes with Pakistani work...you could either buy sugar or flour with it, not both.”

Similar views and analogical comparisons were drawn and shared by many other respondents. For example, Aziz Mohammad Khan, a daily wager in Riyadh, said:

“...Saudi Riyal is heavy and lucky (drund ao bakhtawar); you can buy enough things with it. But conversely, you cannot build a single room while working in Pakistan. On the other hand, you can build a good, cemented house, purchase land and do a lot of things from Saudi work and savings.”

Respondents considered the Saudi Riyal as fortunate (lucky—*qismatdar*), admired it, and had

otherwise feelings for the Pakistani money, deeming it “light and dry currency (*spaka and khusk pesa da*).”

This study finds that the income and currency differentials between the sending and receiving countries account for labor geographical mobility and international migration. Other studies validate the findings of this study. For example, Velazquez (2000) documents that developing countries with the lowest per capita income would provide the highest differentials compared to the gain in receiving and developed countries, driving migration from developing to developed nations. Likewise, Gregory (1991) noted a considerable flow of Colombian migrants to Venezuela because these countries had an income differential of 3.1 to 1. The findings of this study are also in line with Simpson's (2017) study that a stable foreign currency will allow the money earned abroad to procure more stuff in home countries, increasing the net benefit to migration. Mansuri (2006), in a study, found that the currency differential was a reason for emigration (one in four HHs) from Pakistan. He mentioned that the remittances from the households from emigration helped improve their economic and social conditions in Pakistan. So working and saving here (Saudi Arabia), enjoying and consuming there (Pakistan) was the popular idea of every migrant worker in Saudi Arabia.

#### **4.4. The family and peers' pressure provoke migration**

Out of 60, 48 (80%) respondents mentioned that their families and peers instigated, enabled, and facilitated their travel to Saudi Arabia. For example, Amin Ullah Khan, who belonged to Mingora city of Swat and worked as a plumber in Jeddah, told:

“Most of my family members such as father, brothers, uncles, cousins, and friends are here...life was tasteless for me (*peeka peeka*) in Pakistan...so I asked them to send a visa and came three years ago.”

Outmigration is utterly men's business in the Pakhtun-Patriarchal society (Saeed, 2012). Friends and peers greatly influence the decision of migration. Likewise, Omar Khaliq, a young car mechanic in Dammam, mentioned that most of his close friends had come to Saudi Arabia and started earning and supporting their families. He further said that he did not get good grades in school and had no job; therefore, he was a liability for the family. Thus, some of his schoolmates and close friends motivated him to Saudi Arabia. He said that he now feels good and enjoys his friends' company and work/live together.

For many respondents, migration to the Kingdom was like a predetermined family trend and skill learning. For example, Naseem Jan, a young marble worker in Riyadh, said:

“You know sons follow the father and do whatever father does. My father and two older brothers were here, so they brought me here as well. I learned the work of marble and gypsum false ceiling from them and now expert of it and can take independent contracts.”

Many other study participants shared similar views. Stark and Bloom (1985) and Harbison (1981) state that migration from developing countries is a joint family decision. Thus, the households decide the migration of the other members to boost the household income. Similarly, Boyd (1989) documents that family and peers functions as support network shaping



the motivation and incentives for migration. The terrestrial distribution of the family members and other relatives or peers partially determines the migration destination (Harbison, 1981). For example, many people will migrate to places where they have family members because they can be relied upon to provide food, shelter, and information, which help them cope with their new environment (Boyd, 1989; Harbison, 1981). In addition, the presence of family members and friends at the destination places reduces the psychological impact of culture shock through the perpetuation of old customs in the new location (Boyd, 1989). I agree with Boyd (1989) that family and peer networks drive ethnic groups to migrate and concentrate in specific regions. Because of their strong networks that migrants from the same areas in Pakistan had a high concentration in the particular regions of KSA and were doing similar work.

#### **4.4. Strong social networks of the KP migrants in Saudi Arabia perpetuate migration between Pakistan and KSA**

Pre-existing labor networks and cultural familiarity with the destination places perpetuate migration flow (Harbison, 1981; Van Hear *et al.*, 2018). It is perfectly valid in the case of this study. For example, 46 out of 60 (76.66 %) respondents considered the existence of social networks in Saudi Arabia as the driving force of their migration. For instance, Nowsheerwan, a construction worker from the Matte region of Swat district, said:

“In Saudi Arabia, we feel like at home...majority of our male relatives and friends are here... newcomers don't face difficulties in terms of adjustment and finding the work.”

Another respondent, Gohar Ali, from Dir Lower and working as a sales boy in a superstore in Jeddah, provided a detailed description of the vitality and function of the existing social networks in driving emigration from Pakistan. He mentioned:

“...the newcomer in Saudi Arabia is received by 15 to 20 of his relatives and friends at the airport. A lavish feast is thrown in his honor that night. Usually, a lamb is cooked to celebrate the arrival of the new mate. The same happens when a person goes back to Pakistan on leave or final exit. The newcomer usually enjoys several weeks as a guest, and people from the same and neighboring deras (migrants' abode) give money when they visit and welcome him. He accumulates roughly SR. 1000 to 1500 as a welcoming present. After a few weeks, he joins the club and goes to work.”

Migration networks connect migrants through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared vicinity, operate as channels of information, resources, support, and enabler of outmigration (Massey & Akresh, 2006). This study validates the migrant network theory, which implies that network ties play a significant role in the decision of migration (Massey & Espinosa, 1997). Likewise, the findings of this study are in line with the results of (Tasleem *et al.*, 2021), who, in a recent qualitative push-pull study of Pakistani migrants in Malaysia, noticed that network relationships had enabled emigration to Malaysia with positive outcomes.

I agree with Garip and Asad (2016) that migration networks act as a social facilitator and determine the regions or areas appropriate for emigration, help identify the individuals involved in the process, and provide needful information and resources to maintain a permanent flow of

migration. Further, the network also determines the type of job to be taken by the new migrants. Thus migrant networks work as a form of social capital for the migrants and hence facilitate the provision of information that lowers the costs and risks of migration (Massey *et al.*, 1993), therefore perpetuating "chain migration" (King, 2012; Massey *et al.*, 1993). However, the migrant networks in Saudi Arabia helped establish informal regional organizations called (unions) *Tanzeems*, which work to resolve workers' issues and provide them protection and security.

Pakhtun migrants from every region have informal organizations (unions) in Saudi Arabia with a well-established hierarchy of roles, responsibilities, and membership patterns. The members contribute a specific amount (around 20 Riyals or more) to the organization, providing social security and support to those who die or suffer any injuries in KSA and Pakistan. In this regard, Naseer Shah, secretary-general of one of such organizations, shared further details about the organization's function. He said:

“...early workers made tanzeems that still exists. The tanzeem provides social security and is like an insurance company for us. For example, when a worker dies, the tanzeem gives his family some money, ranging from SR. 50000 to SR. 90000 or more depending on the number of persons in the tanzeem. It also makes arrangements for the transportation of the deceased to Pakistan. For the injured workers, tanzeem pays SR. 15000 to SR. 25000 depending on the nature of the injuries. We have developed rules and regulations for all matters. For example, active workers in Pakistan on leave, if die or receive some injuries get half of the amount. Besides, the tanzeem also settles all sorts of disputes among the workers and liaison with the embassy.”

Literature does not document such arrangements in other places. The reason is that workers in other countries have insurance policies and labor unions, ensuring their safety and security. However, the lack of these facilities in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries has led migrant workers to adopt alternate arrangements in the form of *tanzeem*. Therefore, I agree with Palloni *et al.* (2001) that perpetual migration establishes a social infrastructure in the shape of social networks in the host countries, influences the migrants' supplement in the labor market, degree of commitment of members involved, and development strategies.

#### **4.5. Migration to Saudi Arab potentially help elevate the social status and prestige in Pakistan**

Expatriation to Saudi Arabia has positive outcomes for the emigrants, their left-behind families, and the region. A high number of respondents, 41 out of 60 (68.33 %), considered Saudi Arabia's emigration a source of uplifting the social status, prestige, power, and upward mobility. For example, Amir Alam, an old-aged technician in a private Saudi company at Dammam, sketched the changes spurred by Saudi Arabian migration in the social status of many low-income families at his locale, Samar Bagh of Dir Lower. He said:

“Our region was impoverished. Poor people used to farm the land of others. Then, people started going to Karachi and other industrial places in Pakistan for work but still could barely sustain their lives and families. They had muddy houses (khatoo or kacha koorona) and could not educate their children. They

were living in utter ignorance and would fight on trivial issues. However, the opening of Gulf migration in the 1970s turned their fortune. Those poor people now have more wealth, land, and properties than the big farmers and seetan (rich people), enjoying better status and class. Now they are respected, admired, and fully integrated. Some even have challenged the status quo and competed in the elections.”

While echoing it, some respondents uttered that working in *Arabo* (Arab countries) can help establish relationships with other tribes through marriages. In addition, people perceive the Saudi Arabian migrants as financially sound, gift-givers, and can arrange visas for the unemployed in-laws. Likewise, Wali Khan, a construction worker at Riyadh, told:

“Dear! Surely, no woman would marry you if you could not earn the bread and sustain the family. You can easily get a wife by working in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabian migration has many advantages. It elevates your position and changes your status. People believe that Saudi workers earn well, can help in needy situations, and send gifts to their in-laws.”

Besides, many respondents opined that the lavish lifestyle and fashion of the Saudi returned workers motivate others to move to Saudi Arabia. For example, Zeshan, a pharmacist in Riyadh, said:

“Hmmm! In my view, back home, people admire and wish to wear white clothes and use expensive fragrances like the Saudi returned workers. The lavish lifestyle of Saudi workers inspires others' movement to Saudi Arabia. They also want to demonstrate and enjoy the same lifestyle upon returning to Pakistan.”

Reiterating to Zeshan, another respondent, Sheer Zameen, said:

“Saudi returned workers look fresh, chubby, healthy, and prosperous. They wear glittering and branded watches, bring quality foreign house stuff, enjoy good kitchen appliances, buy cars, put children in private schools, and build cemented (pakha korona) houses. Everyone wishes to be like them and thus desire to move to the Middle East.”

In Pakistani community, migration to Saudi Arabia is then perceived as a source of status, position, influence, and power change. Further, it potentially provides the required means for upward mobility. For example, it enables one's access to powerful spaces through the education of children, accumulation of wealth via the establishment of some business, investing in other productive resources, and establishing matrimonial and social ties with influential circles and classes in society.

However, for many providing a comfortable life to their left-behind family and raising the quality of life was the axil point of their mobility to KSA. For example, Yasar Amin, a sale person in a supermarket at Dammam, told:

“You know! We burn ourselves here to provide a comfortable life to our kids back home. Our elders did not have the means to provide us a good life,

education, diet other amenities of life. So, we suffer for the best and secure future of our children.”

Other respondents echoed Yasir Amins' views as well. Studies validate these views of the current study participants. For example, studies have found that the migrants' income helped reduce debt reduction, raised saving and investment, and improved the quality of life by providing households access to better nutrition, food, housing, education, and health services (Ahmed *et al.*, 2010; Rahim *et al.*, 2020; Ullah, 2015). The study of Awan *et al.* (2013) conducted in the Peshawar district also validates the findings of this study. For example, it documents that 51 percent of the total income of migrant households was used on consumption expenditure, including food, health, education, housing, and transport.

In contrast, the remaining half was used to repay loans, income generation resources like business, a better quality of life, and asset formation. Similarly, the study of Gioli *et al.* (2013) on the emigrants of Swat and Dir districts found 35 percent of the remittance investment in real estate and construction, 28 percent in businesses, 17 percent spending on social ceremonies, 9 percent on pilgrimage (9 percent, and 7 percent on transport. Thus, the migration of one or more family members significantly improves the economic and social quality of the entire household is a well-established idea in Pakistan's policy and popular discourses.

#### **4.6. Migration to Saudi Arabia helped escape the hostile and turbulent environment of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**

The proximity of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with the tribal belt (ex-FATA—Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and Afghanistan has made it a hotbed of ferocity. Further, the *zar* (wealth), *zamin* (land) and *zan* (women), and *badal* (revenge) norms are the significant reasons for conflicts among the Pakthuns (Saeed, 2012). Besides, the Afghan war, the war on terror, and TTPM (Tehrike Taliban Pakistan Movement) further exacerbated the security situations in many regions of KP, including the Dir and Swat districts. Therefore, I agree with Amjad and Arif (2014) that the high conflict and turbulent regions of KP are high migration areas. The current study also validates this fact. For example, a high proportion of the study participants (39 out of 60) stated that migration to Saudi Arabia helps escape turbulence, tribal conflicts, and family feuds. For example, Sadar Khan, a construction worker in Riyadh from Hayagai of Dir Upper, said:

“You might have heard that (wazgar sari mazgho ki shetan v) empty mind is evil's residence. People interfere in the affair of others when they are free and jobless. People are ignorant (jahil), stubborn (sakht), and petty fights. There are foes on trivial matters. Saudi Arabia's immigration provides a safe exit from tribal and interpersonal conflicts.”

Reiterating it, Qadeem Khan said:

“Oh dear! The more you are far and away from home and village conflicts, the more you are in tranquility.”

However, many mentioned that emigration and remittances had helped the ongoing conflicts in specific regions, e.g., Hayagai, Doag Dara, Barawal, and other places. For example, Sarwar

Khan from Sheringal of Dir Upper mentioned that some emigrants' remittances further the foes by procuring ammunition and heavy artillery with it. However, this trend is declining owing to the exposure of emigrants to foreign societies and the increase of education, told by Ishaq Shakoore, a construction contractor (*teekadar*) from the Barawal region of Dir Upper. Moreover, some opined that the arbitral initiatives of the *tanzeems* (region migrants' organizations) have helped settle these disputes. However, harmony among the workers is essential for the effective social networking and functioning of the *tanzeem*. Thus, issues among the workers had to be resolved to achieve prosperity and development, uttered by few respondents. For example, Sheer Rahman said:

“Dear friend! Thirty years ago, there would have been foes and enmities, but now people do not like conflicts. Saudi Arabia has changed our people's warring (*share*) and vengeful (*badal*) attitudes. Nowadays, people prefer to change their living conditions and lifestyle by going abroad instead of upholding the old stubborn and ignorant culture.”

Gioli *et al.* (2013) document that remittances play a significant role in sustaining local livelihood during conflicts. It also helps reinstatement activities such as rebuilding destroyed homes, dwellings, and basic infrastructure (Gioli *et al.*, 2013). Thus migration becomes a survival strategy during conflicts and turbulence (Sanaullah, 2021). It is perfectly valid in the case of Dir and Swat when the insurgency caused the migration of around 2.5 million people in 2009. The lack of law and basic physical security devastated the proximate economic consequences in Dir and Swat. In this regard, the outmigration drivers of the people of Dir and Swat argued were triggered by conflicts and human insecurity. Likewise, the war and conflicts in Afghanistan enticed outmigration for the millions of its citizens to Iran, Pakistan, and other countries (Velazquez, 2000). The proximate cause of such migration is the direct impact of conflict and militarization (Velazquez, 2000).

#### **4.7. Religious affiliation and cultural similarity motivate the migration of workers from KP to KSA**

Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and home to the two holiest sites for Muslims, inspiring Muslims' migration, including Pakistan. Nearly all the study participants (95%) expressed that besides the economic motives, their travel to KSA was inspired by their intention to perform the Hajj and Umrah (pilgrim) and visit other religious places in Saudi Arabia. For example, Nasir Hussain, an older auto-mechanic at Dammam, mentioned:

“Brother! Travel to Saudi Arabia puts you in a win-win situation (*hum khurma hum sawab*—eat the date and earn bounty as well. So, every person comes to Saudi Arabia to intend that if he makes some fortune fair enough, otherwise would get the chance of performing the Hajj and Umrahs.”

Echoing it, another respondent, Kashif Khan, told:

“In Saudi Arabia, you get both money and honey. Here workers could earn a handful amount and could perform Hajj and Umrah.”

Many respondents mentioned that applying for the Hajj and Umrah from Pakistan needs a lot

of money and is beyond their reach. However, when a person comes to Saudi Arabia for work, he does the Hajj and Umrah, uttered by Shah Khalid, a younger participant who had recently come to Saudi Arabia and had performed several Umrahs and one Hajj.

Nonetheless, the migration to Saudi Arabia is driven by religious, cultural, and sentimental affiliations of the study population. For example, like Saudi Arabia, where 93 percent of the population is Sunni Muslims, nearly 100 percent of the Dir and Swat districts are Sunni Muslims, thus idealizing the Saudi Arabian (Islamic) way of life. Moreover, because of the profoundly religious and sentimental attachment of the people of Dir and Swat with the holy land, nearly every Pakhtun Muslim desire to die and be buried in the holy places, mentioned by Mir Alam. Therefore, some respondents preferred the religious factors more than the economic drivers for their emigration to Saudi Arabia. However, the majority considered both the financial and spiritual drivers equally important. However, others considered emigration to achieve economic benefits and religious bounties through the proverbs *hum khurma hum sawab* or *money and honey*.

## 5. Conclusion

This study intended to map out the push-pull drivers incepting and perpetuating migration from the Dir and Swat regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. Data were qualitatively collected from 90 migrant workers belonging to Dir and Swat districts in three migrants concentrated areas of Saudi Arabia. The thematic analysis of data revealed the conditions dissatisfying people in their home place and provoke for migration to Saudi Arabia include poverty, high unemployment, low wages and minimum return for work, the pressure of the family and peers, the desire of changing the social status and getting access to resources ensuring the quality life for themselves and their families, escaping the turbulent and strife-ridden environment, and religious fulfilment in the form of Hajj and Umrah.

Likewise, the pulling drivers attracting workers in Saudi Arabia included high demand for work, more employment opportunities, high wages and savings, economic growth, a strong network of relatives and friends, peace and order, the existence of social security system in the form of informal laborers regional organizations and religious affiliation to Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam and home to the two holiest places for Muslims. This study concludes that a complex combination of the push-pull drivers configures the conditions and circumstances within which Khyber Pakhtunkhwa people migrate to Saudi Arabia. However, the Kingdom's recent initiative of localizing the jobs, blue-collar in specific, is quickly squeezing for foreign workers. This will alter the influx of workers to Saudi Arabia. However, jobs considered low in prestige, salary, and status will remain with the ex-pats.

## References

- Acosta, P., Calderón, C., Fajnzylber, P., & Lopez, H. (2008). What is the impact of international remittances on poverty and inequality in latin america? *World Development*, 36(1), 89-114. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.02.016>
- Adams, R. H., & Page, J. (2005). Do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries? *World Development*, 33(10), 1645-1669. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.05.004>
- Ahmed, V., Sugiyarto, G., & Jha, S. (2010). Remittances and household welfare: A case study of Pakistan. *Asian Development Bank, Economics Working Paper Series No. 194*. [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1632200](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1632200)
- Amjad, R., & Arif, G. M. (2014). Analyzing the impact of overseas migration and workers' remittances in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Suggested measures for maximizing development benefits. *London School of Economics, International Growth Centre*.
- Awan, M. T., Khan, S., & Khan, N. (2013). assessing utilization pattern of remittances at household level in District Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. *International Journal of Arts and Commerce*, 2(4), 172-183. <https://www.ijac.org.uk/images/frontImages/gallery/Vol. 2 No. 4 April 2013/14.pdf>
- Bakewell, O., Kubal, A., & Pereira, S. (2016). Introduction: Feedback in Migration Processes. In O. Bakewell, G. Engbersen, M. L. Fonseca, & C. Horst (Eds.), *Beyond Networks. Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship* (pp. 1-17). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Boyd, M. (1989). Family and personal networks in international migration: Recent developments and new agendas. *International Migration Review*, 23(3), 638-670. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2546433>
- Buehn, A., & Eichler, S. (2013). Determinants of illegal Mexican immigration into the US southern border states. *Eastern Economic Journal*, 39(4), 464-492. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/eej.2012.24>
- Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment. (2016). Export of manpower analysis 2016. <https://beoe.gov.pk/files/statistics/yearly-reports/2016/2016.pdf>
- Creswell, J. W., & Clark, V. L. P. (2017). *Designing and conducting mixed methods research*. Sage Publications.
- De Bel-Air, F. (2015). Demography, Migration and Labour Market in Saudi Arabia 2014. [http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32151/GLMM%20ExpNote\\_01-2014.pdf?sequence=1](http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32151/GLMM%20ExpNote_01-2014.pdf?sequence=1)
- De La Garza, R., & Rodolfo. (2010). Migration, development and children left behind. *UNICEF, Division Of Policy And Strategy, Working Papers 1005*.
- Dibeh, G., Fakih, A., & Marrouch, W. (2019). Labor market and institutional drivers of youth irregular migration in the Middle East and North Africa region. *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 61(2), 225-251. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022185618788085>
- Errichiello, G., & Nyhagen, L. (2021). "Dubai is a transit Lounge": Migration, temporariness and belonging among Pakistani middle-class migrants. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 30(2), 119-142. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01171968211013309>
- Garip, F., & Asad, A. L. (2016). Network Effects in Mexico–U.S. Migration: Disentangling the Underlying Social Mechanisms. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 60(10), 1168-1193. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764216643131>
- Giola, G., Khan, T., & Scheffran, J. (2013). Remittances and Community Resilience to Conflict and Environment Hazards in North Western Pakistan. In *Remittance Flows to Post-*

- Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development* (pp. 117-126). Boston: Boston University, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Center for Finance, Law & Policy.
- Gregory, P. (1991). The determinants of international migration and policy options for influencing the size of population flows. In S. Díaz-Briquets & S. Weintraub (Eds.), *Determinants of Emigration from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean* (pp. 49-74). Routledge.
- Harbison, S. F. (1981). Family Structure and Family Strategy in Migration Decision Making. In G. F. De Jong & R. W. Gardner (Eds.), *Migration decision making: Multidisciplinary approaches to microlevel studies in developed and developing countries* (pp. 225-251). Pergamon Press.
- Hyder, A. (2017). National Poverty Report of Pakistan, 2015-16. *Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform, Islamabad*.
- Imran, K., Devadason, E. S., & Kee Cheok, C. (2020). Foreign remittances and regional poverty: evidence from household data. *International Migration*, 58(4), 214-230. <https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12681>
- Jamal, H. (2021). Updating Pakistan's poverty numbers for the year 2019. *Social Policy And Development Centre (Spdc), Karachi, Pakistan*.
- King, R. (2012). Geography and migration studies: Retrospect and prospect. *Population, Space and Place*, 18(2), 134-153. <https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.685>
- Kumari, R., & Shamim, I. (2007). Gender dimensions of international migration from bangladesh and india: socio economic impact on families left behind. Centre for Social Research/Centre for Women and Child Studies/ South Asia Network of Economic Research Institute, New Delhi.
- Lee, E. S. (1966). A theory of migration. *Demography*, 3(1), 47-57. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.2307/2060063>
- Maimbo, S. M., & Ratha, D. (2005). *Remittances: Development impact and future prospects*. World Bank.
- Mansuri, G. (2006). *Migration, sex bias, and child growth in rural Pakistan*. Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank Group. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/8423?localeattribute>
- Martin, P., & Sirkeci, I. (2017). Recruitment, remittances, and returns. In K. A. Reinert (Ed.), *Handbook of Globalisation and Development* (pp. 312-330). Edward Elgar.
- Massey, D. S., & Akresh, I. R. (2006). Immigrant intentions and mobility in a global economy: The attitudes and behavior of recently arrived U.S. immigrants. *Social Science Quarterly*, 87(5), 954-971. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2006.00410.x>
- Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1993). Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal. *Population & Development Review*, 19(3), 431-466. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2938462>
- Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1994). An evaluation of international migration theory: the North American case. *Population & Development Review*, 20(4), 699-751. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2137660>
- Massey, D. S., & Espinosa, K. E. (1997). What's driving Mexico-U.S. migration? A theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis. *American Journal of Sociology*, 102(4), 939-999. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/231037>
- Moustakas, C. E. (1994). *Phenomenological research methods*. Sage.



- Nelson, J. (2018). Why poverty has not reduced significantly in Pakistan. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1614607/2-poverty-hasnt-reduced-significantly-pakistan/>
- Nyumba, O., Wilson, T, Derrick., & Mukherjee, N. (2018). The use of focus group discussion methodology: Insights from two decades of application in conservation. *Methods in Ecology and Evolution*, 9(1), 20-32. <https://doi.org/10.1111/2041-210X.12860>
- Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. (2019). Population, labour force and employment. [https://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter\\_20/12\\_Population\\_Labour\\_Force\\_and\\_Employment.pdf](https://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_20/12_Population_Labour_Force_and_Employment.pdf)
- Palinkas, L. A., Horwitz, S. M., Green, C. A., Wisdom, J. P., Duan, N., & Hoagwood, K. (2015). Purposeful sampling for qualitative data collection and analysis in mixed method implementation research. *Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research*, 42(5), 533-544. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10488-013-0528-y>
- Palloni, A., Massey, D. S., Ceballos, M., Espinosa, K., & Spittel, M. (2001). Social capital and international migration: A test using information on family networks. *American Journal of Sociology*, 106(5), 1262-1298. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/320817>
- Prior, M. J. (1979). *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rahim, D. A. A., Mahmud, R., & Boroh, R. P. (2017). Relationship of Unemployment Rate and Remittance with Indonesian Immigration in Malaysia. *Malaysian Journal of Business and Economics*, 4(1), 65-75. <https://jurcon.ums.edu.my/ojums/index.php/mjbe/article/view/1074>
- Rahim, S., Ali, S., & Wahab, S. (2020). Does remittances enhances household's living standard? Evidence from pre- and post-Gulf crisis. *Journal of Public Affairs*, e2442. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2442>
- Rana, S. (2016). 40% Pakistanis live in poverty. *The Express Tribune*. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1126706/40-pakistanis-live-poverty/>
- Ravenstein, E. G. (1885). The Laws of Migration. *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, 48(2), 167-235. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2979181>
- Ravenstein, E. G. (1889). The Laws of migration. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 52(2), 241-305. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2979333>
- Saeed, M. (2012). *Pakhtun men's perceptions of the conditions promoting domestic violence in their culture*. Doctoral Dissertation, University of York, UK. <https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/2271/>
- Saeed, M., & Griffin, G. (2019). Researching a sensitive topic in an unstable environment: Fieldwork dilemmas in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 19(3), 248-258. <https://doi.org/10.1108/QRJ-02-2019-0013>
- Sanaullah. (2021). Civilians' survival strategies during the Taliban's insurgency (2007-9), Pakistan: a look at the consequences. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 32(1), 26-52. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1840892>
- Simpson, N. B. (2017). Demographic and economic determinants of migration. <https://wol.iza.org/articles/demographic-and-economic-determinants-of-migration/long>
- Stark, O., & Bloom, D. E. (1985). The new economics of labor migration. *American Economic Review*, 75(2), 173-178. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805591>

- Tasleem, Z., Muhammad, S. A., Na'eim Ajis, M., & Abidin, N. A. Z. (2021). Pakistan to Malaysia: What expectations behind migration? *Journal of International Migration and Integration*. 1-22. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12134-021-00860-y>
- Ullah, O. (2015). The effect of remittances on socio-economic condition and decision making process of rural families: A case study of Peshwar, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan. <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:851396/FULLTEXT01.pdf>
- Ullah, S., KHan, I. U., & Ali, T. (2018). Child labour migration and access of their parents' to basic needs: a quantitative study of Dir Upper Pakistan. *Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ)*, 2(1), 29–36. <https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.lassij/2.1.4>
- United Nation Development Program. (2015). Human Development Report 2015.
- Van Hear, N., Bakewell, O., & Long, K. (2018). Push-pull plus: reconsidering the drivers of migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44(6), 927-944. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1384135>
- Velazquez, F. C. (2000). Approaches to the study of international migration: A review. *Estudios Fronterizos*. [http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=S0187-69612000000100004](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0187-69612000000100004)
- World Bank. (2013). Pakistan - Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Public Expenditure Review. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16034>
- Yousaf, H., & Ali, I. (2014). Determinants of poverty in Pakistan. *International Journal of Economics and Empirical Research (IJEER)*, 2(5), 191-202. <https://ideas.repec.org/a/ijr/journal/v2y2014i5p191-202.html>